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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Income inequality has become one of the closely followed societal subjects in
global media within the last few years. For example, the New York Times
launched a noticeable campaign on income inequality last year.1 The Finan-
cial times as well as the Economist have also reported on developments in
income inequality numerously in recent times.2
Why is income inequality causing media interest then? One factor con-
tributing to this interest is that income inequality seems to be increasing in
developed economies after contracting for a nearly of a century (see Figure 1
in Section 1.2.2). From history, we know that the concentration of wealth on
the hands of those who are already rich can cause social unrest or even coups
d’état (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Income inequality also infringes the
ideal of the foundation of (most) western economies, i.e. that all men (and
women) are born equal. In addition, income inequality may lower the level
of human capital by diminishing education opportunities for lower income
households, inﬂict additional costs to producers by increasing illegal rent-
seeking, and cause ﬁnancial instability by increasing the leverage among the
not-so-fortunate citizens (Fishman and Simhon 2002; Kumhof and Ranciére
2010; Shaw and McKay 1969). Thus, besides the rather obvious societal ram-
1See the New York Times Topics and income inequality.
2For the Economist, see the issues of 20th of April and 24th of March 2011. For FT,
see issues of 5th and 12th of May 2011.
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iﬁcations, income inequality may have a subtler negative eﬀect on the growth
prospects of a country.
Within the last two decades or so, the relationship between income in-
equality and economic growth has been widely debated and it has emerged
one of the major ﬁelds in economics.3 At the same time, the literature on
this relationship has become concentrated on assessing the eﬀect empirically
typically by using data that consists on time series observations from several
countries. This has been due to the fact that the theoretical literature has
produced results supporting both sides of the "aisle", i.e. both the negative
and the positive eﬀect of inequality on growth (Galor and Moav 2004; Stiglitz
1969).4 Unfortunately, the results of empirical studies have also been contro-
versial (Barro 2000; Banerjee and Duﬂo 2003; Castelló-Climent 2010; Forbes
2000; Persson and Tabellini 1994).
Many modern studies have used panel data consisting only on a handful of
time series observations on several countries, i.e. ’short panels’, to study the
relationship between inequality and growth (Barro 2000; Forbes 2000; Li and
Zou 1998; Persson and Tabellini 1994). This thesis makes an eﬀort to resolve
the above mentioned discrepancy by analyzing data from both short panels
as well as from panels with long time series from several countries. By using
panels with a long time series dimension, this thesis also looks for a possible
long-run relationship between inequality and growth, which is a topic that
has not been studied almost at all previously. Thesis also contributes on one
of the classic questions in economics, i.e. does the propensity to save increase
with income? This is another ﬁeld within the growth literature that tends to
lack consensus even on the direction of the eﬀect of inequality (Cook 1995;
Leigh and Posso 2009; Li and Zou 2004; Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén 2000).
The rest of this introductory chapter presents the theories and methods
applied in this thesis. Summaries of the three studies presented in Chap-
ters 2-4 are also given. Section 1.2 opens with a historical introduction to
the distributional aspects advanced by economic theory. It also presents the
3A simple search for "income inequality economic growth" on Google Scholar produced
over 746.000 results on the 16th of May 2011.
4Naturally there is also a third eﬀect or a non-eﬀect meaning that inequality could also
have no eﬀect on growth. But, such result would lack theoretical interest which returns
the question on the (possible) eﬀect of inequality on growth as an empirical one.
2
measures of income inequality used in this study and gives an overview to
the recent global trends in the inequality of income. The modeling of income
variation and the distribution of income are discussed in Section 1.3. Section
1.4 presents the general economic theories developed to explain the eﬀect of
income inequality on economic growth. Issues related to the analysis of panel
data are discussed in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 summarizes the ﬁndings of this
thesis.
1.2 Income inequality: the wisdom of economic
thought and global trends
Money is like muck, not good except that it be spread.
- Francis Bacon (1625)
1.2.1 What determines the division of product among
the factors of land, labor, and capital?
The classical query posed in the title of this section has basically governed the
economic science throughout its entire existence. This is because economics
was, in principle, founded to answer two questions: how can we achieve devel-
opment and what determines the distribution of product among the factors of
land, labor and capital? They were the two main themes discussed in Adam
Smith’s (1776) seminal book on the wealth of nations and both of them were
contributed by several classical authors, including Malthus (1815), Ricardo
(1817), and Mill (1845). As it turned out, neither of these questions have
been easy to answer. The distribution of product amongst the factors of pro-
duction has divided the economic sciences for the last two centuries while the
literature on economic growth has, during the same period of time, produced
only few facts about the factors behind economic development.
As the history of the last 200 years has shown us, economic progress
brings in its train an indispensable array of beneﬁts. We know that economic
development promotes health, increases the life expectancy, and increases the
overall quality of life of individuals (Doepke 2004; Galor and Weil 2000). Most
of these gains have been produced by following the idea of market capitalism,
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namely an economic system where the means of production are privatively
owned and used to make proﬁt. However, as put forth by Schumpeter (1942),
capitalism is a way of creation through destruction. What this means is that
a market economy is engaged in a process of competition which constantly
creates new through the destruction of the old and ineﬃcient. This endoge-
nous creative process of innovation and economic development enables the
growth in productivity and drives the technological progress, which raises our
quality of life. What this process also creates, however, is a continuing cycle
of creation-destruction-creation, where some individuals and businesses are
thrown out of proﬁts and suﬃcient income for a short or possible extended
period of time. This process of capitalist market economy further complicates
the issue of distribution, as the individuals who are thrown out of income are
no longer factors of production, at least in the strict sense of production, for
the time they remain outside the productive workforce. Market economies
also tend to go through diﬀerent phases of development that may increase or
decrease the level of inequality accordingly.
Kuznets (1955) constructed a theory to explain the changes in the dis-
tribution of income during the process of development in capitalist market
economies. According to the so called Kuznet’s relation, the inequality of
income will ﬁrst increase and then decrease in the course of economic devel-
opment. Inequality will increase in the beginning of industrialization due to
a growing wage disparity between agricultural and factory pay. Lower mor-
tality rates, greater fertility rates, and investments in new technology will
also increase the inequality of income during the ﬁrst phases of industrial-
ization. Growth of inequality is necessary because an egalitarian agrarian
economy cannot accumulate enough savings so that capital creation would
be suﬃcient for production growth. Later on, as the economy industrializes,
the distribution of income will even out as a larger portion of people move
to a higher industry pay.
Kuznets (1955) made a respectable eﬀort to describe the (natural) divi-
sion of product among the factors of production in diﬀerent stages of eco-
nomic development. Unfortunately, empirical research following his seminal
paper on the curvilinear relation between the distribution of income and the
level of development has produced some mixed results (Frazer 2006; Gagliani
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1987; Nielsen 1994). Moreover, current trends in income inequality in devel-
oped economies stand in stark contrast against the Kuznet’s relation (see
Figure 1 below). So, even if the Kuznet’s relation would describe the evolu-
tion of the distribution of income during industrialization, it does not seem
to ﬁt very well on the post-industrialized economies. In economic theory, the
"great divide" had also already occurred before Kuznet’s published his the-
ory. Growing income inequality in major newly industrialized economies in
the late 18th and early 19th century had created a divide within the eco-
nomic sciences on how societies should determine the distribution of product
among its citizens. These two ends of the spectrum where (are) the Socialist
economic theory put forth by Marx and Engels (1848) and Marx (1887), and
the Austrian school created by Menger (1871).
Marx (1887), as the father of the Socialist economic system, saw the cap-
italist economy as an exploiter of the working class in beneﬁt of the rich.
He argued that stripping down the rights that gave the capitalists the power
to oppress the working class, i.e. the right to own capital and land, equality
both in income and prominence among individuals would follow suit.5 How-
ever, the fall of the Soviet Bloc in the late 20th century showed that applying
Marx’s theory to practice was extremely diﬃcult, if not impossible.6 Marx’s
idea of collective governance over the production factors led to ineﬃciency in
production due to centrally governed division of product among the factors
of production (Walder 1991; Weitzman 1991). Thus, in a Socialist economic
system, the redistribution of income was done by government oﬃcials, not by
market signals. This, naturally, led to a serious incentive problem amongst
the workers as returns to their production factor, the labor, was not deter-
mined by their eﬀort.7 Wages and private consumption was also held back
which caused the living standard to remain very low (Åslund 2007). In ad-
5This refers to the whole production of Marx, not just The Capital and Manifesto of
the Communist Party .
6It should be noted, however, that Marx never mentioned revolution (Ekelund and
Hébert 1990). It is thus possible that Marx thought that socialism would be the end-point
of capitalism, meaning that after certain stages of development capitalism would lead to
socialism.
7In socialistic systems labor force usually included also the land-owners, or the kolkhoz
and sovkhoz, because owning of land was prohibited. Government jurisdictions were the
owners of the capital (Walder 1991).
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dition, centrally planned economies were plagued by shortages of goods and
services. Regardless of the obvious problems faced by Communist economies,
the actual economic reasons for the collapse of Socialist economic system
are still somewhat debated (see Åslund (2007); Easterly and Fischer (1995);
Harrison (2002); Zubok (2008)).
At the other end of the spectrum, the Austrian school of economics saw
the price mechanism and, thus, the free ownership of the factors of pro-
duction as the best (the most eﬃcient) way to allocate income among in-
dividuals (Hayek 1945; Mises 1969). The economic doctrine of the Austrian
school opposed government interventions to the "self-eﬃcient" market mech-
anism. Therefore, the Austrian school advanced the idea of a free market, or
laissez-faire, economic doctrine. Despite the fact that the idea of free-market
economics has been fairly popular within the economic sciences, no country
has actually adopted the economic doctrines of the Austrian school literally
(Stringman and Hummel 2010).
Within the last 50 years or so, a model that can be seen as a hybrid of
these two ends has also emerged.8 In accordance with the Stockholm eco-
nomic school, the so called Nordic economic model, which incorporates free
market ideology in a society with a highly developed structures of social insur-
ance, was developed. This "hybrid" has been able to combine relatively high
growth rate to reasonably ﬂat distribution of income. Especially within the
last 20 years, the Nordic model has also shown its resilience to many shocks
commonly associated with capitalist systems, including ﬁnancial crises and
recessions (Aaberge et al. 2002; Mayes 2009).
1.2.2 Measuring income inequality
How has the income inequality evolved in countries with diﬀerent economic
systems? In this thesis two diﬀerent measures of income inequality are used,
which can be used to shed some light on this matter. These measures are the
8Before the Nordic model was developed, many European countries had also created
system that incorporated aspects from both Socialism and free-markets. Nordic model is,
however, probably the prime example of a economic doctrine that incorporates the best
features, i.e. free market thinking and extensive social security, of both of these economic
models.
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EHII inequality measure, which is based on the Gini index by Deininger and
Squire (1996), and the income share of the top 1% of income earners.
Probably the most common measure of income inequality has been the
Gini index or the Gini coeﬃcient. Formally, the Gini coeﬃcient is deﬁned as:
Gini = 1
2n2
ni=1nj=1∣yi − yj ∣; (1.1)
where n is the number of households,  is the mean household income, and
yi and yj are income of any two of the n households (Culyer 1980). Thus,
the Gini index gives the relative position of diﬀerent households within the
income distribution. One of the problems of the Gini index is that it re-
quires quite a lot of information. To calculate it accurately one needs the
mean household (or person) income within a country, which in many cases
is very hard to come by. This has also caused problems with the compara-
bility of the data, as income data is usually gathered diﬀerently in diﬀerent
countries. Some countries, for example, gather income data from households
while others gather it from individuals. This, naturally, can lead to serious
comparability problems across countries.
To overcome these problems there has been a growing interest towards
using taxation statistics to estimate the level of income inequality within
the last decade or so. This has opened up a possibility to construct lengthy
time series on the evolution of the top income shares of population from
several diﬀerent countries. Top income share data uses the same raw data
from all countries and it is constructed using the same methodology for every
country (Piketty 2007). This should make the series comparable. The long
time series also makes it easier to assess possible structural changes. However,
some disadvantages remain. First and foremost, fully homogenuous cross-
country data just does not exist, although the tax statistics may be the
closest we can get to a data that is homogeneous across countries. It is also
possible that the top income shares follow diﬀerent processes in time than
the overall inequality does. Furthermore, the possibility of tax avoidance may
have biased the results. Nevertheless, top income shares have been found to
track broader measures of income inequality, like the Gini index, very well
(Leigh 2007).
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the top 1% income share within 11
7
developed economies during the 20th century. In spite of somewhat diﬀerent
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Figure 1. The share of income of the top 1% of population in 11 developed countries
1880-2009. Source: Alvaredo et al. (2011)
social policies among these 11 developed nations, income inequality has fol-
lowed a strikingly similar pattern during the last century or so. In accordance
with the Kuznet’s relation, income inequality has followed a falling trend al-
most all countries through the 20th century, but in the end of the 20th century
the trend seem to have reversed. Roine and Waldenström (2011) have exam-
ined the question that does the series of top income of developed countries
include structural breaks, i.e. breaks in the mean and/or trend of the series.
They found that there is evidence of a common trend-break in the series of
8
top 1% income share in the years 1945 and 1980.9 The break in 1945 shows
a shift from faster decline of income inequality to a more slower decline. The
break in 1980, however, constitutes a shift after which the declining trend
either changes to increasing trend or to a stable non-increasing/-decreasing
trend. That is, in this sub-sample of developed countries, the share of income
of the top 1% has been growing or remained stable since the 1980s.
To get a bigger picture of what has happened within the last 20 years,
Figure 2 presents the mean value of the EHII2008 inequality measure for 96
countries.10 This measure is created using the Gini index by Deininger and
Squire (1996), the annual data on wages on the manufacturing sector and
the manufacturing share of population published by the United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organization (Galbraith and Kum 2006).11 The ﬁgure
36
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Mean of EHII2008
Figure 2. The mean of the EHII2008 inequality measure for 96 countries 1963-2002. Source:
Galbraith and Kum (2006)
9The number of countries included in the stydy by Roine and Waldenström (2011) was
9.
10EHII stands for Estimated Household Income Inequality.
11For more detailed description of the EHII2008 inequality measure see Section 2.3.1.
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endorses the ﬁnding by Roine and Waldenström (2011). The mean of income
inequality has clearly increased since the 1980.
What countries then have contributed the most for the increase of the
mean after the 1980s? Figure 3 presents the mean values of the EHII2008
inequality measure for groups of former Communist and Nordic countries, the
mean values for the group of 9 out of the 11 developed countries presented
in Figure 1, and the mean values for the remaining 69 countries presented in
Figure 2.12 According to Figure 3, the biggest increases in income inequality
25.0
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32.5
35.0
37.5
40.0
42.5
45.0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Mean COMMUNIST Mean DEVELOPED
Mean NORDIC Mean 69
Figure 3. The mean values of the EHII2008 inequality measure for Communist, Nordic,
and developed countries 1963-2002. Source: Galbraith and Kum (2006)
have occurred in the former Communist countries, where the inequality also
12Former Communist countries include: Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Soviet
Union/Russia, and Yugoslavia. Values of Croatia and Slovenia overlap with the values
of Yugoslavia for three years from 1986 to 1989. Nordic countries include: Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
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seems to have been at the lowest level during the Communist era.13 In Nordic
countries, the trend seems quite stable although there is an upward kink in
the graph in 2001. Income inequality in the remaining 69 out of 96 countries
seems quite stable although it also has risen from the 1980s. Thus, the reversal
of the downward trend in inequality in developed economies and the raise in
income inequality in transition economies seem to have contributed the most
on the global trend of increasing inequality during the last two decades.
1.3 The process of income variation and the
distribution of income
The forces determining the distribution of income in any com-
munity are so varied and complex, and interact and ﬂuctuate so
continuously, that any theoretical model must either be unrealis-
tically simpliﬁed or hopelessly complicated.
-D. G. Chambernowne (1953)
The very ﬁrst formal models on the distribution of income by Chambernowne
(1953) and Mandelbrot (1961) were based on the assumption that the process
of income variation is stochastic. Intuitively this seems like a very reasonable
assumption as, at least, some part of the individual income is usually deemed
to ﬂuctuate randomly from year to year.
Later on, for example, Deaton (1991) has used random walk to approx-
imate the developments in labor income through time in his study on how
liquidity constraints aﬀect national savings. Deaton assumed that the labor
income of an individual follows an AR(1) process of the form:
log(yt+1) =  + log(yt) + log(zt+1); (1.2)
13It should be noted that due to data quality and political issues concerning income
distribution, the income distribution data obtained under the Communist rule is likely
to be quite unreliable (Åslund 2007). However, it is also true that in many transition
economies poverty rose after transition due to falling output and wages. At the same
time, the middle-class emerged. These two contracting developments have been likely to
contribute to the rapid rise of income inequality in the former Communist countries. Still,
the actual magnitude of the dispersion of income is more or less unclear.
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where yt is labor income, zt+1 is stochastic random variable, and  > 0 is a con-
stant. When zt+1 is assumed to be identically and independently distributed,
the labor income process, log(yt), is I(1) non-stationary and, speciﬁcally,
it follows a random walk with drift (see Section A.1 for a more detailed
deﬁnition of the random walk and I(1) nonstationary processes). An I(1)
nonstationary processes have a inﬁnite memory, i.e. they are highly persis-
tent. Assuming some degree of persistence in the evolution of the income
series (yt) of an individual is quite intuitive, as shocks (e.g., wage raise) to
the income process of an individual may have permanent eﬀects on the future
income of the individual. Therefore, the random walk model (1.2) appears to
be a good description of labor income.
However, it is also likely that some deterministic factors like education
aﬀect on the labor income. In a recent study on the evolution of consumption
and income inequality, Blundell et al. (2008) model the income of households
to be varying according to:
logYit = Zitt + Pit + vit; (1.3)
where Zit is a set of income characteristics that are observable and known
by consumers at time t,14 vit follows a moving average process of order q (a
MA(q) process), and Pi;t = Pi;t−1+it with it serially uncorrelated, indicating
that the process {P} is I(1) nonstationary. Several studies in the micro
literature tend to ﬁnd that also empirically the permanent component Pit
is a random walk, and hence it can be modeled as an I(1) nonstationary
process (Meghir and Pistaferri 2004; Hall and Mishkin 1982; Blundell et al.
2008).
When individual income series are aﬀected by a random walk component,
their aggregated time series is likely to be characterized by a random walk
(Rossanan and Seater 1995). However, the distribution of income is often
measured using some bounded measure, like the Gini index or the share
of income. This issues a question on the random walk hypothesis, as any
measure that varies within some boundaries like the income share, cannot, by
deﬁnition, be an I(1) nonstationary process. This is because the variance of
14These include demographic, education, employment status, ethnic, etc. factors (Blun-
dell et al. 2008)
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such a series cannot grow inﬁnitely, which is one property of the random walk
process. However, it is possible that the distribution can have stochastic trend
in its other moments, like the mean, skewness, and kurtosis, than variance
(White and Granger 2010). This way the measure of income inequality, being
a functional of some income distribution having a stochastic trend in one or
several of its higher moments, may exhibit such high levels of persistence
that it is better approximated by an I(1) process than a stationary process.
1.4 Theoretical eﬀects of income inequality on
economic growth
You cannot have the beneﬁts of capitalist market growth without
the support of, virtually, all the people.
-Alan Greenspan (C-Span, September 2007)
1.4.1 The origins
The question, how does the distribution of product aﬀect the production was,
for some time, a more infrequently studied subject in economics, although
the relation between the distribution of income and income growth was com-
mented already by Smith (1776). Smith argued that because national savings
govern the accumulation of capital, and because only the rich people saved,
the accumulation of capital required that there were enough rich people in
the society. However, Smith also argued that production growth would not be
possible without suﬃcient demand. He stated that every man should be able
to provide for himself and his family. This would constitute the threshold of
sustainable inequality, and it would also assure a suﬃcient level of demand
in the economy.
Despite the fact that the classical doctrine generally argued that invest-
ment was a result of savings, not much emphasis was put on how the distri-
bution of income would aﬀect savings after Smith (1776). This was because
classical economic thought relied quite often to the Say’s law. What Say’s
law states is that supply creates its own demand, implying that saving is the
potential demand (a "promise" of consumption) that is just working through
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investments. There was, however, one loud critic of the Say’s law among the
Classics. Malthus (1836) argued that savings ex ante need not to always equal
investments ex ante. That is, consumption can exceed production resulting
to an over-demand, which will lead to diminished wealth of a nation due
to excessive use of productive capital. But, Malthus (1836) never developed
his critique to explain how market forces maintain the optimum rate of sav-
ings, and the monetary causes of overproduction (Ekelund and Hébert 1990).
Thus, Say’s law remained the cornerstone in classical economic thinking.
It took a century before Keynes (1936) ﬁnalized the critique of the Say’s
law put forth by Malthus (1836).15 Keynes presented his theory of aggre-
gate demand and consumption in his principal work, The General Theory
of Employment, Interest, and Money, which also stated that inequality of
income will lead to slower economic growth. Keynes argued that marginal
consumption decreases as the income of an individual increases, and thus
aggregate consumption depends on changes in aggregate income. According
to Keynes, demand is the basis of investments, and because inequality low-
ers aggregate consumption, the inequality of income will diminish economic
growth by diminishing investments.
Stiglitz (1969) summarizes the ﬁndings of the classical economic theory
as follows. In classical economic theory, inequality of income was assumed
to inﬂuence economic growth rates through savings and consumption. When
the saving function is linear, e.g. si =myi + b, where yi is output per capita,
m is the marginal propensity to save, and b is the per capita savings at
zero income, aggregate saving behavior in an economy is not aﬀected by the
distribution of income. However, if the saving function is nonlinear, aggregate
savings become dependent on the distribution of income.
When the saving function is linear or concave, distribution of income
and wealth converge toward equality (Stiglitz 1969). If the saving function
is convex, i.e. the marginal propensity to save increases with income, more
unequal distribution of income results in higher capital intensity through
greater aggregate savings. Thus, in a steady-state equilibrium, where income
is distributed unevenly, the wealth of a nation is greater than in the steady-
15Note: the second edition of Principles of Political Economy generally cited from
Malthus, was published posthumously.
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state equilibrium, where income is distributed evenly. However, these steady-
state equilibria exist only when all individuals have positive wealth. Thus,
result may not apply, for example, to developing countries.
1.4.2 Modern theories
There are basically three main strains of modern theories on the eﬀect of
income inequality on economic growth. These include the political economy
model by Perotti (1993), a model of division of labor and specialization by
Fishman and Simhon (2002), and the two-regime model by Galor and Moav
(2004), which combines the classical approach with human capital theory by
Becker (1965) and Mincer (1974). All these strands of theoretical literature
rely on the human capital theory and on the assumption of credit restrictions.
Human capital theory explains the role of human capital in the production
process as specialization (schooling) and on-the-job investments (training)
(Acemoglu 2009). Credit-market imperfections refer to the situation in which
people’s access to credit is restricted. These restrictions can originate from
the regulations of legislative institutions, credit rationing imposed by central
banks, or from underdeveloped banking sector. Further, credit-market im-
perfections are present when acquiring credit in return for expected future
proﬁts is gravely limited.
Political economy models assume that preferences of individuals are ag-
gregated through political process. Therefore, redistribution of income and
economic growth are driven by the political process. Political process can be
driven by a median voter or by organized social groups. In the model by Per-
otti (1993), the equilibrium reached by the economy depends on the initial
distribution of income. If the aggregate capital is very small, redistribution
of income through taxes and subsidies will result in a poverty trap where
no one is able to acquire education. In this case, a more unequal distribu-
tion of income will support the economy because at least some individuals
are able to acquire education and increase the level of human capital. As
economy becomes more developed, very unequal income distribution may
diminish growth because the accumulation of human capital would require
that middle-income and poor individuals acquire education, as the rich have
already educated themselves. In a rich economy, only the poor may increase
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the level of human capital, and therefore higher steady-state growth path
requires that income is distributed evenly.
If an economy’s aggregate capital is small, unevenly distributed income
urge capital owners to invest in specialization (Fishman and Simhon 2002).
In this case, inequality results to a higher level of human capital, a higher
division of labor, and thus to faster economic growth. When an economy’s
aggregate capital is large, the more equal distribution of income encour-
ages households to invest in specialization and entrepreneurship. In this case,
equality of income will create a more risk-free environment and wide-based
demand for goods. This will lead to higher employment, greater division of
labor, and to faster economic growth.
In the model by Galor and Moav (2004), the engine of economic growth
changes from physical capital to physical and human capital in the process of
economic development. The process of economic development is divided into
two regimes, which have their own steady-state growth paths. Economies in
the ﬁrst regime are underdeveloped, aggregate physical capital is small, and
the rate of return to human capital is lower than the rate of return to physical
capital. In this regime inequality increases aggregate savings by increasing
the income of the rich and greater aggregate savings fuel physical capital
accumulation.
In the second regime, economies are rich and the rate of return to hu-
man capital is so high that it induces human capital accumulation (Galor
and Moav 2004). Therefore, both human and physical capital are engines
for economic development. Since individuals’ investment in human capital is
subjected to diminishing marginal returns, the return to human capital in-
vestments is maximized when investment in human capital is widely spread
among the population. Because access to credit is constrained, human capital
investment is maximized when income in the economy is distributed evenly.
1.5 Analyzing panel data
I am obliged at the outset to draw attention to the fact that
analysis of variance can be, and is, used to provide solutions to
problems of two fundamentally diﬀerent types. These two distinct
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classes of problems are: class I: detection and estimation of ﬁxed
(constant) relations among the means of sub-sets of the universe
of objects concerned; class II: detection and estimation of compo-
nents of (random) variation associated with a composite popula-
tion.
- Churchill Eisenhart (1947)
A panel or a longitudinal data set consists of several time series, indexed
t = 1; :::; T , for several cross-sectional units, indexed i = 1; :::; n, where i can
be country, a municipality, a ﬁrm, and so on. Therefore, the observations can
be collected to a single vector, for example:
Yi = (yi;1 ::: yi;T i)′ i = 1; :::; n
Y = (Y ′1 ::: Y ′n)′;
where the vector (Y ′1 :::Y ′n) includes the time series observations of the n
statistical units or individuals.
The use of panel data posses several major advantages over cross-sectional
or time-series data. Panel data usually gives a larger number of data points,
which increases the degrees of freedom and reduces collinearity among ex-
planatory variables, thus improving the eﬃciency of estimates. Dynamics of
change or the dynamic coeﬃcients cannot usually be estimated using cross-
sectional or single time series data (Hsiao 2003). Cross-section estimations
also usually fail on making inference about the dynamics of change as their
estimates tend to reﬂect inter-individual diﬀerences inherent in comparisons
of diﬀerent people, ﬁrms, or countries. That is, cross-sectional data is un-
able to distinguish between individuals or countries in diﬀerent regions, for
example, as it cannot use the information on subjects that change between
regions. With panel data, this can be done, as it includes information on the
subjects from a long(er) period of time.
In time series analysis, analyzing some dynamic models requires that the
lag coeﬃcients needs to be assumed, a priori, to be a function of only a
very small number of parameters (Hsiao 2003). Otherwise, multicollinearity
can be a problem.16 If panel data would be available, the interindividual
16Consider a distributed lag model of the form:
yt = hk=0kxt−k + t; t = 1; :::; T;
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diﬀences in the (exogenous) explanatory variables could be used to reduce
the problem of collinearity. Panel data also allows one to control for one of
the crucial problems arising in cross-sectional of time series data, namely
the omitted variables bias. If individual- or some group-speciﬁc factors aﬀect
on the dependent variables, explanatory variables can capture the eﬀects
of these factors, and parameter estimates will not represent the true eﬀects
of the explanatory variables per se. With panel data, one can utilize the
intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the subjects being studied.
Consider, for example, a simple time series regression:
yt =  + ′xt + zt + t (1.4)
where xt and zt are exogenous variables,  is a constant and the error term t
is independently and identically distributed over t with mean zero and vari-
ance 2. If zt are observable, there is no problem and the coeﬃcients of  and
 can be consistently estimated using OLS. However, if zt are unobservable
and the covariance between xt and zt is nonzero, the OLS estimator of coeﬃ-
cients on xt is inconsistent. If we would be able to use repeated observations
from the same individual, model (1.5) would be given as:
yt =  + ′xit + zit + it; (1.5)
where it is now identically, independently distributed over i and t with mean
zero and variance 2 . Now, if zit = zt for all i meaning that the values of z
stay constant across individuals, one is able to take deviation from the mean
across individuals at a given time yielding:
yit − yt = ′(xit − xt) + (it − t): (1.6)
Thus, the (unobserved) eﬀect zt is eliminated and OLS can be used to obtain
consistent and unbiased estimates of  from (1.6).
The limitations of the panel data analysis include the possible hetero-
geneity bias and cross-sectional dependence. Even though the panel data can
cope with heterogeneity of the data better than the cross-sectional or time
where xt is an exogenous variable and t is random disturbance term. Now, obviously, xt
is near xt−1, and still nearer 2xt−1 − xt−2 = xt−1 + (xt−1 − xt−2) (Hsiao 2003). Thus, a fairly
strict multicollinearieties appear among h + 1 explanatory variables.
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series data, ignoring the individual or time-speciﬁc eﬀects that exists among
cross-sectional or time series units can still lead to parameter heterogeneity in
the panel model speciﬁcation (Hsiao 2003). If, for example, the slopes of the
estimated parameters in the model (1.5) would diﬀer, i.e. i ≠ j, straight-
forward pooling of all observations from diﬀerent individuals could lead to
nonsensical pooling, as it would just give a average of coeﬃcients that dif-
fer across individuals. Furthermore, time-varying intercepts and coeﬃcients
would also be likely to cause bias.
Large macro panels including long time series from several countries,
which all possible belong to some group, like the OECD countries, may be
aﬀected by cross-sectional dependence. The cross-sectional dependence arises
when, for example, the GDP series of several countries are correlated with
each other. This may lead to biased inference if not accounted for. Especially,
in cointegrated panels cross-sectional dependence can bias the results of the
tests and estimators considerably (Baltagi 2008; Mark and Sul 2003).
1.5.1 Basic estimators of panel data
In panel data models, the conditional expectation of y given x can be exam-
ined by using the linear regression:
yit = i + X ′it + it; it ∼ N(0; 2); it ⊥ Xit: (1.7)
where  is aK×1 vector of parameter coeﬃcients (excluding intercept). Now,
if ui ⊥ Xit, but i ≠  ∀i, a random eﬀects estimator can be used to estimate
model (1.7). It is based on a model:
yit =  + X ′it + ui + it; ui ∼ N(0; 2u); it ∼ N(0; 2 ); (1.8)
where following assumptions must hold:
Eui = Eit ≡ 0; (1.9)
Euiuj = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ 
2
u if i = j
0 if i ≠ j; (1.10)
Eitjt = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ 
2
 if i = j; t = s
0 otherwise;
(1.11)
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and
ui ⊥ Xit; (1.12)
it ⊥ Xit; (1.13)
it ⊥ ui: (1.14)
In the case of random eﬀects, the OLS estimator is no longer the BLUE, i.e.
the best linear unbiased estimator. Thus, in the case of random eﬀects, the
estimation must be conducted with generalized least squares estimator, or
GLS.
However, if ui upmodels_uni0338 Xit, the GLS random eﬀects estimator will be incon-
sistent. In this case, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator can be used. Fixed eﬀects
estimator is based on the model:
yit = i + ′Xit + it; it ∼ N(0; 2); it ⊥ Xit
i = 1; :::; n; t = 1; :::; T;
where i is a scalar of constants representing the eﬀects of those variables
speciﬁc to the ith individual. The OLS estimator of ﬁxed eﬀects is also called
the least-squares dummy variables, or the LSDV estimator. The LSDV esti-
mator removes the individual eﬀects eﬀects, usually by assuming ni=1i = 0
(Hsiao 2003). This way the individual eﬀects i represent the deviation of
the ith individual from the common mean, and they are eliminated from
estimation.
One can also use instrumental estimation methods to control for the pos-
sible endogeneity problem. Endogeneity arises when some or all of the ex-
planatory variables are correlated with some part of the error term. With
panel data this often refers to the situation presented above where ui upmodels_uni0338Xit.
Although LSDV estimator can be used to control for this problem, it is biased
and inconsistent estimator, if explanatory variables include lagged values of
the dependent variable.17 Dynamic panel data models are of the form:
yit =  + yi;t−1 + ui + it; ui ∼ iid(0; 2u); it ∼ iid(0; 2 ) (1.15)
In this case, clearly, ui upmodels_uni0338 yi;t−1. Now, the general method of moments (GMM)
estimator can be used to consistently estimate model (1.15). For the instru-
mental variables, denoted as Zit, it is required that ui ⊥ Zit. In the case of
17However, with T Ð→∞ the LSDV estimator becomes consistent.
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(1.15), lags of diﬀerences of explanatory variables can be used as instrumental
variables for yit as ﬁrst diﬀerencing eliminates the individual time-invariant
variables ui. So, for example, (yi;t−1 − yi;t−2) and (yi;t−2 − yi;t−3) can be used
as instruments for yi;t−1, (yi;t−2 − yi;t−3) and (yi;t−3 − yi;t−4 ) can be used as
instruments for yi;t−2, etc.
1.5.2 Estimation in cointegrated panel data
Estimators presented above are consistent and/or asymptotically unbiased
only when the underlying data is not cointegrated (Baltagi 2008; Kao and
Chiang 2000). Cointegration refers to a stationary linear combination of in-
tegrated variables. Cointegration thus implies that there is a long-run equilib-
rium relation between the integrated variables. Integration, or I(1) nonsta-
tionarity of a variable means that a stochastic trend aﬀects the evolution of
the series through time. Such series are described in A.1. Integrated variables
have a inﬁnite memory and they are highly persistent meaning that they are
described by strong autocorrelation between successive observations of the
time series.
Assume, for example, that we have a two-dimensional time series of the
form: ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ y1t = x
∗
t + 1t
y2t = x∗t + 2t; (1.16)
with x∗t ∼ I(1) and 1t; 2t ∼ I(0), then
(1 − )⎛⎝ y1ty2t ⎞⎠ = (x∗t − x∗t ) + (1t − 2t) ∼ I(0); (1.17)
Thus, the series Yt = (y1t y2t)′ is said to be cointegrated and the cointegra-
tion vector is [1 − ]. The result presented in (1.17) can also be used to
test for cointegration between I(1) nonstationary variables, i.e. we can test
are some of the linear combinations of the variables stationary.
Mark and Sul (2003) consider a dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator with
ﬁxed eﬀects, heterogenous trends, and common time eﬀects for cointegrated
panel data. The last model accounts for cross-sectional dependence by intro-
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ducing a common time eﬀect. Mark and Sul’s model assumes that observa-
tions on each individual i obey the following triangular representation:
yit = i + it + t + ′xit + uit; (1.18)
where (1;−′) is a cointegrating vector between yit and xit, which is identical
across individuals, i is a individual-speciﬁc eﬀect, it is a individual-speciﬁc
linear trend, t is a common time-speciﬁc factor, and uit is a idionsyncratic
error term that is independent across i, but possibly dependent across t.
Model (1.18) allows for a limited form of cross-sectional correlation, where
the equilibrium error for each individual is driven in part by t.
Panel DOLS eliminates the possible endogeneity between explanatory
variables and the dependent variable by assuming that uit is correlated at
most with pi leads and lags of △xit (Mark and Sul 2003). The possible en-
dogeneity can be controlled by projecting uit onto these leads and lags:
uit = pis=−pi′i;s△ xi;t−s + uit∗ = ′izit + u∗it: (1.19)
The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all the leads and lags of △xit and
the estimated equation becomes:
yit = i + it + t + ′xit + izit + u∗it; (1.20)
where ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. The consistent estimation of
(1.20) is based on sequential limits, meaning that the convergence occurs in
sequential fashion, where ﬁrst T → ∞ after which n → ∞. Equation (1.20)
can be feasibly estimated in panels with small to moderate n.
An alternative to the panel DOLS estimator is the panel VAR estima-
tor by Breitung (2005). He proposes a panel VAR(p) model which can be
presented as a panel vector error-correction model (VECM) as
△yit =  idt + i′y;t−1 +p−1j=1 ij △ yi;t−j + it; (1.21)
where dt is a vector of deterministic variables and  i a k × k matrix of un-
known coeﬃcients,  ij is unrestricted matrix, and it is a white noise error
vector with E(it) = 0 and positive deﬁnite covariance matrix i = E(it′it).
The model is estimated in two stages. First, the models are estimated sepa-
rately across n cross-section units. Then cointegration vectors are normalized
22
so that they do not depend on individual speciﬁc parameters. Second, the
system is transformed to a pooled regression of the form:
z^it = ′yi;t−1 + v^it; (1.22)
where z^it = (^′i^−1i ^i)−1^′i^−1i △ yit and v^it is deﬁned in similar fashion. The
cointegration matrix, , can now be estimated from (1.22) using the OLS es-
timator. It is assumed that the statistical units included in the panel have the
same cointegration rank. Consistent estimation is based on sequential limits.
Cross-sectional correlation is accounted by using an estimated asymptotic
covariance matrix.
1.6 Contributions of the thesis
This thesis concentrates on the panel econometric analysis of the relationship
between inequality and growth. The relationship is studied from three dif-
ferent angles. First, the short-term eﬀect of inequality on growth is studied.
Next, the long-run (equilibrium) relationship between inequality and eco-
nomic development is analyzed. The third chapter concentrates on the eﬀect
that inequality may have on the factors of economic development, namely on
its possible eﬀect on savings.
1.6.1 The eﬀect of income inequality on economic growth
in the short run
In Chapter 2, the eﬀect of inequality on growth is studied by using macroe-
conomic data on a panel of 70 countries. Chapter contributes on two sets
of problems that panel econometric studies have recently encountered. These
are the comparability problem associated with the commonly used Gini index
by Deininger and Squire (1996), and the problem relating to the estimation
of group-related elasticities in panel data.
Many recent studies assessing the eﬀect of inequality on growth have
used the Gini index by Deininger and Squire (1996) as a measure of income
inequality. However, the "high quality" dataset of Deininger and Squire has
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received serious criticism concerning the accuracy, consistency, and compara-
bility of the data (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Galbraith and Kum 2006).
Galbraith and Kum (2006) have created a new improved measure of in-
come inequality called the EHII2008. They have obtained their inequality
measure by regressing Deininger and Squire’s Gini coeﬃcients on the val-
ues of explanatory variables, which include the diﬀerent income measures
of Deininger and Squire’s data set, the set of measures of the dispersion of
pay in the manufacturing sector, and the manufacturing share of the popula-
tion. This should make the values of EHII2008 consistent and comparable as
the data on wages on the manufacturing sector should be comparable across
countries. The EHII2008 inequality measure also has a large data coverage on
diﬀerent countries, which diminishes the small sample bias and the possibility
of systematic errors in estimation.
Many of the theories presented in Section 1.4 assume that the eﬀect of
income inequality on economic growth would diﬀer between countries accord-
ing to their level of economic development. Estimation of such income group
elasticities in panel data with parametric methods would require that some
group-speciﬁc constants are added to the estimated model. This creates a
statistically dubious estimation conﬁguration, and the inference of such esti-
mations is likely to be conditional on the sample (Hsiao 2003; Baltagi 2008).
The general way to avoid the vagueness relating to the use of group- or
individual-related constants has been to use non-parametric methods (Lin et
al. 2006; Banerjee and Duﬂo 2003). The problem with non-parametric meth-
ods is that they are known to lack statistical power compared with parametric
methods in smaller samples generally used in growth literature.
It is shown in this chapter that there is a simple way to ’bypass’ the
vagueness related to the use of parametric methods to estimate group-related
parameters. The idea is to estimate the group-related elasticities implicitly
using a set of group-related instrumental variables. This can be done by
grouping the individuals in the sample, creating group-related explanatory
variable by linking each explanatory variable to each group, and attach-
ing some group-related instrumental variable to each of the group-related
explanatory variables. Although the method is rather simple, the inference
drawn from these estimations should be unconditional or marginal with re-
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spect to the population.
The results obtained using the estimation method described above indi-
cate that the relationship between income inequality and growth is likely to
be non-linear. This result is rather well in line with the results obtained with
non- or semi-parametric methods (Banerjee and Duﬂo 2003; Lin et al. 2006).
1.6.2 The long-run relationship between income inequal-
ity and economic development
Findings in Chapter 2 give only the short- or medium-term eﬀects of inequal-
ity on growth. Potentially more interesting question is, how does inequality
aﬀect economic growth or development in the long-run? Chapter 3 extends
the analysis by studying the possible long-run dependence between inequality
and development.
Chapter 3 incorporates the EHII2.1 inequality measure and a panel data
on macroeconomic variables with annual time series observations from 38
countries to test the existence of long-run equilibrium relation between in-
equality and the level of GDP. According to the panel unit root tests, both
the logarithmic EHII2.1 inequality measure and the logarithmic GDP per
capita series seem to follow an I(1) nonstationary process.18 They are also
found to be cointegrated of order one using panel cointegration tests by Pe-
droni (2004) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), which implies that
there is a long-run equilibrium relation between them.
The eﬀect of inequality on the level of GDP is estimated with panel dy-
namic OLS and panel dynamic SUR estimators using a simpliﬁed production
function including just two factors, namely physical capital and income in-
equality. In accordance with the theory presented by Fishman and Simhon
(2002), the estimated model assumes that the coeﬃcient of inequality re-
ﬂects the eﬀect of human capital on production growth (see Section 1.4.2).
Estimation is based on the following model:
log(GDPit) = i + ′1log(investmentsit) + ′2log(inequalityit)+it + t + uit;
18In unit root testing, the data on the total of 53 countries was used.
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where i are individual constants, it are individual trends, t is the common
time eﬀect, (1;−′1;−′2) is a cointegrating vector between GDP, investments
and inequality, and uit is an idiosyncratic error.
As mentioned above, many of the theoretical models presented in Section
1.4 imply that the growth elasticity of inequality might diﬀer between de-
veloping and developed economies. To take this into account in estimation,
countries in the dataset are divided into three income groups. To make the
estimation of income groups asymptotically feasible, i.e. to make the groups
large enough, countries are divided into three equally sized groups. According
to the results of income group estimations, the long-run growth elasticity of
inequality is negative in the middle-income and rich economies. Results for
developing economies are inconclusive.
These ﬁndings imply that the distribution of income and economic devel-
opment have a steady-state equilibrium relation, or relations, as commonly
predicted by theoretical models. Findings also imply that this relationship
between income inequality and economic growth is negative in developed
economies.
1.6.3 The relationship between inequality and savings
As presented in Section 1.4, the eﬀect of savings on capital accumulation
and growth has always been one of the fundamental research topics in eco-
nomics. In addition to the theories presented in Section 1.4, there are several
theoretical models explaining the eﬀect of inequality on savings.
The permanent income hypothesis by Friedman (1957) states that in-
dividuals with low income have a higher propensity to consume, and small
changes in income, or its distribution, do not aﬀect the consumption decisions
of households. The life-cycle hypothesis argues that, if bequests are luxury,
the saving rate should be higher among wealthier individuals (Kotlikoﬀ and
Summers 1981). Deaton (1991) ﬁnds that when income follows a random
walk process and borrowing constraints are binding, it is undesirable for
households to undertake any smoothing of consumption implying that con-
sumption equals income. In political-economy models, more unequal income
distribution may create demand for more redistribution through taxation
and income transfers. If the saving function of individuals in the economy is
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convex, i.e. the rich save more, this will diminish aggregate savings through
the diminished incomes of the rich (Alesina and Perotti 1994).
Although theoretical research spans several decades, the eﬀect of income
inequality on savings remains an open empirical question. This is due to the
fact that empirical cross-country studies have produced controversial results
on the eﬀect of income inequality on savings (Cook 1995; Leigh and Posso
2009; Li and Zou 2004; Smith 2001). Generally all the empirical studies have
assumed that income inequality, measured either by the Gini index or by the
share of income earned by diﬀerent income classes, is a stationary variable.
However, according to the results presented in Chapter 2, income inequality
may be driven by a stochastic trend indicating that inequality would be
an I(1) nonstationary variable. If this result held in general, it would oﬀer
an explanation to the ambiguous results of the previous empirical studies,
because regressing a stationary variable on an I(1) variable(s) can lead to
a spurious regression (Stewart 2011). In empirical studies, savings is usually
measured as a percentage of the GDP. If both the logarithmic savings and the
logarithmic GDP are I(1) variables and cointegrated, their diﬀerence results,
by construction, in a stationary variable, namely savings as a percentage of
the GDP. Thus, if inequality were an I(1) variable and savings as a ratio of
the GDP a stationary I(0) variable, regressing savings on inequality would
give spurious results.
In Chapter 4, macroeconomic data on nine developed economies span-
ning across four decades starting from the year 1960 is used to study the
eﬀect of the changes in the top income share to national and private savings.
The income share of the top 1 % of population is used as a proxy for the
distribution of income. According to panel unit root tests, the logarithmic
income share of the top 1%, logarithmic gross national savings and logarith-
mic private consumption are all I(1) variables. The income share of the top
1% is also found to be cointegrated with private consumption, which implies
that there is a long-run dependency relation between them. The eﬀect of
inequality on private consumption is found to be negative in the Nordic and
Central-European countries, but for the Anglo-Saxon countries the direction
of the eﬀect (positive vs. negative) remains ambiguous. The results of the
panel cointegration tests are inconclusive on the possible cointegration rela-
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tionship between gross savings and the top 1% income share. The real GDP
per capita and gross savings as well as the real GDP per capita and private
consumption are also found to be cointegrated. This implies that the ratios
of savings and private consumption to GDP would be stationary variables
and hence previous research is likely to have produced biased results on the
eﬀect of inequality on savings.
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Appendix A
Random walk and I(1)
nonstationary processes
When random variables 1; :::; n are identically and independently distributed
with E[t] = 0, the sums
yt = 1 + ::: + t; t = 1;2; ::: (A.1)
are called random walk -processes. The name comes from the fact that the
time series of random walk processes (A.1) tends to wonder through time
with increasing variance. The process of (A.1) can also be deﬁned using a
AR(1) model of the form
yt = yt−1 + t; t ∼ i:i:d; (A.2)
which is now also called an I(1) nonstationary process. When a constant
term ( ≠ 0) is added to equation (A.2)
yt = yt−1 +  + t; t ∼ i:i:d: (A.3)
the process is called as random walk with drift.
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Chapter 2
Inequality and growth: another
look at the subject with a new
measure and method
Abstract1
Recent empirical research on the relationship between income inequality
and economic growth has provided controversial results. Some studies pre-
dict a negative, and some a positive eﬀect of inequality on growth. Answers
to the controversy have usually been sought from problems in the estimation
technique, the measure of inequality, or from some form of non-linearity in
the relationship between inequality and growth. This study accounts these
problems by using an improved measure of income distribution and paramet-
ric group-related panel estimation. In conclusion, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of
inequality is likely to be non-linear.
1A paper based on this chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of International Devel-
opment.
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2.1 Introduction
The eﬀect of income inequality on economic growth has been under intensive
study for several decades, but no clear empirical regularity has emerged.
Empirical research on the subject commenced in 1955 when Simon Kuznets
released his study. Kuznets argued that income inequality will ﬁrst increase at
the beginning of industrialization, but will even out as the economy becomes
more developed. Although Kuznets’ data did provide some evidence of the
existence of such a relation, the subject was only infrequently investigated
during the next four decades. The main reason for this was the lack of data on
income distribution. In 1996, Deininger and Squire released their Gini index,
which quickly became the most used estimate for the income distribution in
growth studies.
After the release of the Gini index, panel data analysis has become some-
what of a standard in studies trying to assess the eﬀect of inequality on
growth, mostly because a simple cross-country estimation can suﬀer from
an omitted-variables bias. If region-, country-, or some group-speciﬁc factors
aﬀect economic growth rates, explanatory variables can capture the eﬀects
of these factors, and parameter estimates will not represent the true eﬀects
of the explanatory variables per se.2 This problem can be diminished us-
ing panel data. Unfortunately, the results of panel data studies have been
controversial.
In one of the ﬁrst panel data studies on the topic, Persson and Tabellini
(1994) found that income inequality has a negative eﬀect on economic growth
rates. Li and Zou (1998) found that income inequality is positively associated
with economic growth, a view supported by Forbes (2000). Deininger Squire
(1998) found that initial inequality in the asset distribution has a strong
negative eﬀect on growth, a ﬁnding which has been supported by Lundberg
and Squire (2003). Recently, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003), Barro (2000), Chen
(2003), and Lin et al. (2006) have found evidence that the relationship be-
tween income inequality and growth might be non-linear.
2There are, for example, clear indications of this in the study by Deininger Squire
(1998, p. 270), where country dummies aﬀected the inequality elasticity of growth. More
detailed analysis of problems relating to the omitted-variable bias in growth regressions
with inequality as an explanatory variable can be found in Forbes (2000).
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Recent panel econometric studies have generally encountered two sets of
problems. First, the Gini index of Deininger and Squire (1996) has attracted
serious criticism concerning its consistency and accuracy (Atkinson and Bran-
dolini 2001; Galbraith and Kum 2006). If the values of Deininger and Squire’s
Gini index are ﬂawed, then the majority of the econometric studies on the
topic are subject to errors.3 Second, estimation of income group elasticities
in panel data with parametric methods requires that some group-speciﬁc
constants be added to estimation, which may cause the inference to be con-
ditional on the countries in the sample. Non-parametric methods have been
used to avoid this problem (Lin et al. 2006, Banerjee and Duﬂo 2003). The
problem with non-parametric methods is that they are known to lack sta-
tistical power compared with parametric methods. Therefore, cross-country
estimation and group-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects estimation have usually been used
to estimate the income group elasticities with parametric methods (see, e.g.,
Chen (2003) and Forbes (2000)). This has, unfortunately, led to question-
able results because many of the estimated models have included a lagged
dependent variable which renders the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator inconsistent with
small time dimensions of data.
This study uses a new inequality measure compiled by Galbraith and
Kum (2006) to correct for the possible bias created by the Deininger and
Squire (1996) Gini index. This study also presents a simple parametric way
to robustly estimate group-speciﬁc elasticities using full data coverage in a
panel setting. The results based on non-linear GMM estimation imply that
income inequality has had a negative eﬀect on growth, but that the relation
may also include non-linearities.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic theo-
ries that have been suggested to provide the causal relationship of income
inequality on economic growth. Section 3 gives more detailed description of
the problems encountered in previous studies, and presents some solutions for
these problems. Section 4 introduces the data, and section 5 gives estimation
details and results. Section 6 concludes the ﬁndings of this study.
3For example, Barro (2000), Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003), Forbes (2000), and Chen
(2003) have used the dataset by Deininger and Squire (1996).
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2.2 The theoretical eﬀect of inequality on growth
Several theories have been proposed on how income inequality might aﬀect
economic growth rates. Some theories describe the long-run and others a
short- or medium-term causal relationship of inequality on growth. Because
this study assesses the short- and/or medium-term eﬀect of inequality on
growth, the long-run eﬀects are not discussed here. The theories regarding
the short- and medium-term eﬀects of inequality on growth can be classiﬁed
into four broad categories: credit market imperfections, political economy,
social unrest, and saving rates, which we discuss next.
2.2.1 Credit market imperfections
Given credit market imperfections, the inequality of incomes is usually as-
sumed to restrict households’ opportunities for education.4 If an economy’s
aggregate capital is small, unevenly distributed incomes urge capital owners
to invest in specialization (Fishman and Simhon 2002). In this case, inequal-
ity results in a higher level of human capital, a greater division of labor and
faster economic growth. When an economy’s aggregate capital is large, more
equal distribution of incomes encourages households to invest in specializa-
tion and entrepreneurship. In this case, equality of incomes creates a more
risk-free environment and a broadly-based demand for goods, which will lead
to higher employment, greater division of labor, and faster economic growth.
2.2.2 Political economy
In a society where the mean income exceeds the median income, the idea
of evening out the distribution of incomes through the political process may
arise (Bénabou 1996). In such cases, taxation and transfer payments are
commonly used to redistribute incomes. Higher taxes can lead to diminished
investments and/or consumption.
4To be more precise, when access to credit is limited, households’ investment opportu-
nities depend on their assets and incomes. Thus, given credit-market imperfections, poor
households usually forgo investment in human capital (Barro 2000).
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When incomes are distributed unevenly, the wealthier portion of the pop-
ulation may try to inﬂuence politicians not to increase taxes and income
transfers, which can lead to a corrupt government. Corrupted administration
causes ineﬃciencies in the distribution of licenses, social beneﬁts, etc. Be-
cause the demand for licenses is usually high and inﬂexible, a rise in license
prices lowers the proﬁts of producers and investors, which is likely to reduce
investment (Murphy et al. 1993).
2.2.3 Unrest related to social policy
Income inequality may motivate individuals to commit crime, illegal rent-
seeking activity or other acts that disturb the stability of society (Bénabou
1996; Merton 1938). Inequality can also increase social disorganization when
social networks are disrupted in residential areas (Shaw and McKay 1969).
Social disorganization may lower social capital and increase crime and delin-
quency rates. Crime and illegal rent-seeking activities may inﬂict additional
costs on producers and investors, which lowers the incentive to invest (Hall
and Jones 1999; Murphy et al. 1993). Low social capital can also increase the
bargaining and enforcement costs of contracts as the parties have less trust
in each other (Ostrom 1990). Low social capital also usually means a more
risk-averse society.
2.2.4 Saving rates
High saving rates are thought to be especially important for developing
economies, because raising an economy to a higher growth path requires sub-
stantial investment (Sachs et al. 2004; Stiglitz 1969). Funds for investments
come from aggregate savings and/or loans from abroad. Domestic investment
can also be replaced by direct foreign investment. These options are not equal
in risk. Large-scale lending can lead to a balance of payments deﬁcit and to
a debt circle if the higher growth path remains unattained. Direct foreign
investment creates jobs and raises income in the region, but also supersedes
domestic supply. A major portion of the proﬁt of foreign ﬁrms is also usually
repatriated to a foreign country, which aﬀects the balance of payments and
hinders the exercise of an independent monetary policy. Foreign investment is
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also usually highly sensitive to economic ﬂuctuations and speculation, which
may cause uncontrollable shifts in the balance of capital.
Thus, increasing aggregate savings may be the safest way for a developing
country to ﬁnance its structural investment. Many theories argue that sav-
ings rates would increase with income. These include the permanent income
hypothesis of Friedman (1957), life-cycle hypothesis of Ando and Modigliani
(1963), which was augmented with intergenerational transfers by Kotlikoﬀ
and Summers (1981), and savings under liquidity constraints of Deaton (1991)
and Seater (1997). Inequality may therefore enhance growth indirectly through
increased aggregate savings and investment.
2.3 Summary of the main problems encoun-
tered in the ﬁeld of study
In this section, we present the problems associated with the Deininger and
Squire (1996) Gini index that has been intensively used in income inequality
studies within the last 15 years. We also oﬀer a simple parametric way to
estimate group-related elasticities in panel data.
2.3.1 Problems with the Deininger and Squire (1996)
Gini index
Many modern studies on the relationship between inequality and growth
have used the Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini index as a measure of in-
come distribution. Most of these studies rely on the “high quality” part of
the data. However, the “high quality” dataset of Deininger and Squire has
attracted serious criticism concerning its accuracy, consistency, and compara-
bility.5 According to Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), Deininger and Squire’s
Gini index includes so many diﬀerent datasets that in many cases the “high
quality” time series cannot be viewed as a continuous series. The diﬀerent
datasets may not be comparable between countries either. These are serious
5All this criticism also naturally applies to the “low” quality part of Deininger and
Squire’s data.
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problems for estimation, because statistical inference requires that obser-
vations are from the same parent population. If the observations are not
comparable even within a country, there is no one parent population, and
the parameter estimates may be spurious. Galbraith and Kum (2006) have
also shown that the income distribution estimates given by Deininger and
Squire’s Gini index are biased in many cases.
The problems concerning the accuracy and consistency of Deininger and
Squire’s (1996) “high quality” estimates can best be demonstrated with the
help of an example.6 The time series of Deininger and Squire’s “high quality”
Gini index for France, Norway, and India are presented in Figure 1. The
ﬁrst thing that attracts attention are the abrupt changes in the values of
the Gini in Norway. The value of the Gini drops by 6 points between 1976
and 1979 and rises almost 3 points between 1984 and 1986. Why would a
Nordic welfare state have experienced such violent changes in its income
distribution when there were no major economic or societal developments or
crises during these periods? There is, however, a far stranger result present
Figure 1. Values of Deininger and Squire’s "high quality" Gini index for France, Norway,
and India. Source: Deininger and Squire (1996)
in Figure 1. According to the Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini index, India
had a more equal income distribution than Norway in 1973 and a more equal
income distribution than France in the 1960s and 1970s. This result is highly
6All the values here are from the updated version of Deininger and Squire’s dataset. As
recommended by Deininger and Squire (1996), 6.6 Gini points are added to all the Gini
values that are from the “expenditure” series.
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questionable, because the poverty rate in India was one of the highest in
the developing economies in the 1990s, and the level of poverty had clearly
declined from the 1970s (Justino 2007). Both Norway and France also had
progressive taxation and extensive publicly ﬁnanced social services by the
1970s.
For comparison, the time series of the EHII2008 Gini index for France,
Norway, and India are presented in Figure 2. The changes in series are grad-
Figure 2. Values of EHII2008 Gini index for France, Norway, and India. Source:
Galbraith and Kum (2006)
ual, as should be the case with a slowly-changing societal variable like in-
come distribution in the absence of economic or other crises. The values of
the Gini index for India are also clearly above those of France and Norway,
which is reasonable considering the diﬀerences in the level of economic de-
velopment and poverty (Justino 2007). The eﬀect of the economic downturn
on income distribution in the Nordic countries at the beginning of the 1990s
is also present in the series for Norway. 7 As pointed out by Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001), the most severe problem in the "high quality" dataset of
Deininger and Squire (1996) is its inconsistency. Like Norway, there are sev-
eral other countries which, according to Deininger and Squire’s Gini index,
7Aaberge et al. (2002) argue that very generous unemployment beneﬁts, a diﬀerent type
of unemployment compared to many previous economic downturns, and the methods used
to calculate the Gini index have probably contributed to the small changes in the income
distribution in Norway during the economic downturn at the beginning of the 1990s. In
other Nordic countries, e.g. Finland and Sweden, the economic downturn and the growth
of unemployment were more severe.
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exhibit some rather aggressive changes in their income distribution within
relatively short time periods without a clear economic rationale.
These problems in the widely-used Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini index
have some profound implications. In the worst case, all previous studies on
the topic using this Gini index have produced nonsense estimates for the
eﬀect of income inequality on growth. Even if the parameter estimates of
income inequality had not been spurious, they still could not be trusted
because the values of Deininger and Squire’s index may have been erroneous.
It is thus likely that we have only a few studies on the subject whose results
we can trust, i.e., those studies that have not used their index as a measure
of income distribution.8 These include Castelló-Climent (2010), who ﬁnds
that inequality has a negative eﬀect on growth in low and middle-income
economies, Frazer (2006), who does not ﬁnd general support for the Kuznets
hypothesis of an inverted relation between inequality and growth using non-
parametric methods, and Lin et al. (2006), who ﬁnd support for the Kuznets
hypothesis using semi-parametric methods.
The EHII2008 inequality measure used in this study has been built "on
top" of the Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini index, a method suggested by
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) (Galbraith and Kum 2006). Galbraith and
Kum have estimated their inequality measure using the various income mea-
sures of Deininger and Squire’s data set, the set of measures of the dispersion
of pay in the manufacturing sector, and the manufacturing proportion of the
population as explanatory variables.9 According to Galbraith and Kum, the
EHII2008 inequality measure has three clear advantages over Deininger and
Squire’s Gini index. It has more than 3000 estimates, while Deininger and
Squire have only about 700 “high quality” estimates. The EHII2008 gets its
8It is of course possible that measures of income distribution used in these studies have
also been ﬂawed, but, for example, Frazer (2006) uses the UNU-WIDER (World Institute
for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University) dataset, which is
considered to be clearly more reliable than the dataset of Deininger and Squire (1996).
9First, Galbraith and Kum (2006) regressed the Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini index
on the explanatory variables to see which are the most important explanatory variables
and then used them to estimate the EHII2008 inequality measure. The large unexplained
(residual) variation, which was the problem in the index of Deininger and Squire, was thus
eliminated from the EHII2008 measure.
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accuracy from the industrial data published annually by the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Changes over time and dif-
ferences across countries in pay dispersion are thus reﬂected in income in-
equality. All estimates are also adjusted to household gross income, which
makes them more congruent. Values of the EHII2008 also correspond to the
estimates for income distributions of other research institutes, such as the
OECD and the UNU-Wider,10 better than those of the Deininger and Squire
Gini index (Föster & Pearson 2002, Galbraith & Kum 2004).
2.3.2 Estimation of group-related elasticities
Various modern studies have used non-parametric methods to assess the pos-
sible non-linearity in the relation between inequality and growth (e.g., Baner-
jee and Duﬂo (2003); Lin et al. (2006)). The problem with non-parametric
methods is that they are known to lack statistical power compared with
parametric methods, especially in the mid-sized samples typically used in
growth studies. That is why many studies have tried to avoid the use of non-
parametric methods by imposing some restrictions on the data. For example,
Forbes (2000) has conducted a sensitivity analysis using ﬁxed eﬀects to esti-
mate the elasticity of growth with respect to inequality separately in diﬀerent
income groups. Her results show that the inequality elasticity of growth is
positive and does not vary between diﬀerent income groups of countries. But
Forbes uses ﬁxed eﬀects in a model that includes a lagged dependent variable,
which leads to biased parameter estimates when the time dimension of the
data is ﬁxed.11 This creates a problem facing the study of non-linear relations
in the dynamic panel setting using the parametric approach. Speciﬁcally, the
group-speciﬁc constants are likely to lead to inference that is conditional
on the particular countries included in the data, and there are usually not
enough observations among diﬀerent groups for feasible group- or country-
speciﬁc instrumental estimation.12
10World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations Univer-
sity.
11For consistency, it is required that the time dimension of the data tends to inﬁnity.
12For example, the smallest groups of Forbes (2000, p. 883) have only 48 and 54 obser-
vations, which are clearly too few to obtain asymptotic eﬃciency in instrumental variable
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Some econometricians argue that the statistical inference, when using in-
dividual constants in panel data, is conditional on the individuals included in
the sample (Baltagi 2008, p. 14). This is because the model using individual
constants is thought to include only the information conﬁned to the indi-
vidual eﬀects present in that particular sample (Hsiao 2003, p. 43). In other
words, if we used dummy variables to “earmark” each individual country or
group in our dataset, our inference would be restricted to just those indi-
viduals, not the population. This problem is closely linked to ﬁxed eﬀects,
or the least squares dummy variables estimator, as the individual eﬀects are
treated as parameters to be estimated.
If we wanted to study the possible non-linearities in the relationship be-
tween inequality and growth with respect to the level of economic develop-
ment, for example, we would need to classify the countries in our dataset in
some way (e.g., as poor, middle-income, and rich) by using a set of dummy
variables. As mentioned above, this may restrict our inference to just the
sample employed. However, this problem can be ‘bypassed’ quite easily by
using a non-linear (instrumental variables) estimator like the GMM. The
idea is to estimate group-related elasticities implicitly using a set of group-
related instrumental variables. This can be done by grouping the individuals
in the sample, creating a group-related explanatory variable by linking each
explanatory variable to each group, and attaching some group-related instru-
mental variable to each of the group-related explanatory variables. The new
group-related variables are used to estimate some set of unknown parameters
drawn from the parameter space. Estimation is carried out implicitly with
the non-linear instrumental variables estimator using a set of group-related
instrumental variables, making the inference unconditional or marginal with
respect to the population.
In practice, however, there is a problem with this method. The number
of estimated parameters, p, is of the order of the product of the number of
groups, ng, and the number of explanatory variables, K, namely p =Kng +1.
So if the number of individuals in the data is larger than the time dimensions
of the data, we end up with a very small number of degrees of freedom rather
estimations. Thus, Forbes is forced to use a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, which is not likely to
be consistent (see previous footnote).
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quickly. Thus, in order for the method to work we need to have a suﬃciently
small number of groups with respect to the time dimension.
2.4 Data
The data used in this study consists of the following variables: real GDP
per capita with the base year of 1996, change in real GDP per capita, gross
investments as a portion of real GDP per capita, average years of schooling,
the Gini index of Deininger and Squire (1996), and the EHII2008 inequality
measure of Galbraith and Kum (2006). The data covers the years 1965 - 2000,
and is mostly compiled from the Penn-World tables (Heston et al. 2006).
Exceptions are the EHII2008 inequality measure, which is acquired from
the University of Texas Inequality Project, the estimate for average years of
schooling which is acquired from the dataset of Barro and Lee (2000), and
the Gini index, which is acquired from the World Bank’s Measuring Income
Inequality Database. The list of countries is presented in the appendix.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
variable mean std. deviation min. max.
GDP 6001.12 6787.93 115.19 34364.50
GDP growth (%) 2.076 5.408 -53.119 27.254
D&S Gini index 37.414 8.574 20.917 57.900
EHII2008 ineq. measure 40.828 6.651 24.156 57.213
investments (%) 17.321 8.869 2.237 69.523
average schooling 5.293 2.795 0.380 12.250
2.5 Estimation
Several model speciﬁcations have been suggested in econometric growth stud-
ies using the Gini index as an explanatory variable.13 Here, a basic Barro-type
extended version of the neo-classical growth model is used to make the results
13See, for example, Forbes (2000), Barro (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (1994).
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comparable. Estimation is based on the following model:
log(growthit) =  + 1log(GDPi;t−1) + 2log(investmenti;t−1)+3log(educationi;t−1) + 4log(inequalityi;t−1) + it (2.1)
where it is the residual, which includes both the possible country-speciﬁc ef-
fect, i, and the error term, it (i ∼ i:i:d:(0; 2u), it ∼ i:i:d:(0; 2 )). Growth is
measured as ﬁve-year averages to control for short-run economic ﬂuctuations
as in Islam (1995). The average growth rate during each ﬁve-year period is
regressed on the values of the explanatory variables in the year immediately
preceding each period.14 The use of ﬁve-year intervals means that there are,
at most, eight observations available for each country. Since the instrumenta-
tion of endogenous variables will drop the maximum number of observations
in the estimation to ﬁve for each country, the estimation covers the years
from 1975 to 2000 in practice.
As shown by Forbes (2000), the estimation of equation (2.1) is compli-
cated by the endogeneity of the GDP, which can be demonstrated by writing
the GDP growth as the diﬀerence in levels of income and adding incomei;t−1
to both sides:
log(incomeit) =  + log(incomei;t−1) + 2log(investmenti;t−1)+3log(educationi;t−1) + 4log(inequalityi;t−1) + it; (2.2)
where  = 1+1. Clearly E(itincomei;t−1) /= 0. In panel data, all explanatory
variables can correlate with the (possible) country-speciﬁc eﬀect, and this has
to be taken into account in the estimation. Because of this, and because model
(2.1) is dynamic by nature, estimation is done with the generalized method
of moments estimator (GMM) (Arellano and Bond 1991). The beneﬁts of the
GMM include heteroskedasticity not aﬀecting it and its being easily equipped
to withstand autocorrelation.
In this paper, the ﬁrst and second lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of all ex-
planatory variables are used as instruments for the explanatory variables in
levels (Arellano and Bower 1995).15 Thus, (Xi;t−2−Xi;t−3) and (Xi;t−3−Xi;t−4)
are used as instruments for Xi;t−1, and (Xi;t−3 −Xi;t−4) and (Xi;t−4 −Xi;t−5 )
14The averaged growth rate in 1986 to 1990, for example, is regressed against the values
of the explanatory variables in 1985.
15The correlation between diﬀerence and level commonly diminishes rapidly after the
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are used as instruments for Xi;t−2, etc. It is therefore assumed that all the
explanatory variables are predetermined such that E(itX′is) = 0 ∀ t > s,
where X is the matrix of explanatory variables.
The reason for estimating equation (2.1) in levels is the fact that trans-
forming the data with ﬁrst diﬀerencing or orthogonal deviations to elimi-
nate the unobserved individual eﬀects also eliminates the individual country-
related information in those eﬀects.16 By eliminating individual eﬀects, we
may actually create a spuriously better ﬁt for our data, because we also
remove some of the individual variation present in the data.
Table 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of the ﬁve-year av-
erage growth rate and simple correlation coeﬃcients between the ﬁve-year
growth rate and the EHII2008 inequality measure in levels and in ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences. According to the means and standard deviations shown in table 2.2,
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for 5 year average growth rate and the
EHII2008 inequality measure
variable mean s.d.
5 year average growth rate in levels 5.951 3.478
5 year average growth rate in ﬁrst-diﬀ. -0.514 3.998
variable corr. p-value
5 year aver. gr. and EHII2008 in levels -0.1694*** 0.0005
5 year aver. gr. and EHII2008 in in ﬁrst diﬀ. 0.1006 0.0656
5 year aver. gr. in levels and EHII2008 in ﬁrst diﬀ. -0.217*** <.0001
5 year aver. gr. in ﬁrst-diﬀ. and EHII2008 in levels 0.079 0.1322
S.d. stands for the standard deviation of the variable. Corr. gives the value of the simple
correlation coeﬃcient between the growth rate and the EHII2008 inequality measure in
levels and in ﬁrst diﬀerences. P-value gives the p-value of the simple correlation coeﬃcient.
not much variation would be lost in diﬀerencing the ﬁve-year average growth
rate. However, the simple correlation coeﬃcients tell a diﬀerent story. When
the average growth rate is given in levels, the correlation coeﬃcient with the
second lag. Thus, only the ﬁrst two lags of diﬀerences are usually relevant for the identiﬁ-
cation. Using too many moment conditions could also result in bias in the GMM estimator
(Ziliak 1997).
16These unobserved country eﬀects reﬂect, among other things, the diﬀerences in the
initial level of eﬃciency (Bond et al. 2001).
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EHII2008 inequality measure is negative regardless of the form in which the
EHII2008 is given (i.e., in ﬁrst diﬀerences or levels). The correlation coeﬃ-
cient is positive if the average growth rate is presented in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
This indicates that, although the external variation does not seem to change
much in ﬁrst-diﬀerencing, some information is clearly lost, which is very likely
to aﬀect the inference drawn from the data. That is, the results of our estima-
tion could be totally diﬀerent if we used ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data. The results in
table 2.2 thus indicate that removing individual eﬀects by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing
runs the risk of causing erroneous inference.
The estimation results of equation (2.1) are presented in table 3. The
Newey-West estimator with lag one is used as the GMM estimator’s weight
matrix to account for autocorrelation in the variables appearing in the or-
thogonality conditions. Hansen’s J test is used to evaluate the validity of
extra instruments. According to the test, the orthogonality conditions seem
quite realistic for the chosen set of instruments. According to the results
of GMM estimation presented in table 2.3, only lagged GDP per capita is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. However, the result may have been
aﬀected by the small sample bias, because the GMM estimator may exhibit
substantial bias in dynamic panel data model estimations with small samples
(Hayakawa 2007).
To diminish the possible bias, we estimate the equation (2.1) using only
the EHII2008 as a measure of income distribution. This increases the number
of countries included in estimation to 70 and the number of observations to
263.17 According to results presented in table 2.4, the elasticity of growth with
respect to inequality is about -0.014. The elasticity of growth with respect to
lagged GDP is approximately -0.007. The elasticity of growth with respect to
investments was about 0.028. The elasticity of growth with respect to average
years of schooling was approximately 0.008.
The GMM estimation results in table 2.4 are in line with general economic
theory, contrary to those in table 2.3, where, for example, the coeﬃcient
of investments was not statistically signiﬁcant. Although there are several
17Countries that have observations in 4 consecutive estimation periods are included
in the estimation. This is the minimum number of observations because 3 time series
observations are lost due to instrumentation.
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Table 2.3: Estimation results for growth rate I
Estimator: FE-OLS FE-OLS GMM GMM
Constant 0.0173 0.0303** 0.0588* 0.0719***
(0.0077) (0.0106) (0.0281) (0.0188)
GDPi;t−1 -0.0031**** -0.0032**** -0.0044*** -0.0054
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0031)
investmentsi;t−1 0.0025 -0.0086 0.0091 0.0041
(0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0140) (0.0124)
years of schoolingi;t−1 0.0030* 0.0016 0.0035 0.0048
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0059)
D&S gini indexi;t−1 -0.0027 - -0.0628 -
(0.0021) (0.0572)
EHII2008i;t−1 - 0.0034 - -0.0079
(0.0027) (0.0055)
countries 34 34 34 34
observations 183 203 103 136
Hansen test - - 0.27 (8) 0.92 (8)
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001, **** = p<.0001. Standard errors are presented
in parentheses. Hansen stands for Hansen’s test for overidentifying restrictions and the
number of instruments is presented in parentheses. All OLS estimations are done using
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. First and second lags
of ﬁrst diﬀerence are used as instruments for explanatory variables in GMM estimation.
A Newey-West estimator with lag one is used as the GMM estimator’s weight matrix to
account for autocorrelation in the variables appearing in the orthogonality conditions.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results for growth rate II
Estimator: FE-OLS GMM
Constant 0.0336**** 0.0979***
(0.0087) (0.0274)
GDPi;t−1 -0.0026**** -0.0070**
(0.0003) (0.0023)
investmentsi;t−1 -0.0055 0.0277*
(0.0042) (0.0137)
average schoolingi;t−1 -0.0014 0.0082*
(0.0009) (0.0037)
EHII2008i;t−1 -0.0010 -0.0142*
(0.0023) (0.0065)
countries 70 70
observations 413 263
Hansen test - 4.61 (8)
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001, **** = p<.0001. Standard errors are presented
in parentheses. Hansen stands for Hansen’s test for overidentifying restrictions and the
number of instruments is presented in parentheses. All OLS estimations are done using
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. First and second
lags of ﬁrst diﬀerence are used as instruments for explanatory variables in GMM
estimation. A Newey-West estimator with lag one is used as the GMM estimator’s
weight matrix to account for autocorrelation in the variables appearing in the
orthogonality conditions.
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possible reasons for this strange result, including sample selection, one likely
explanation is that the results in table 2.3 may have suﬀered from small
sample bias.
The results in table 2.4 thus imply that the inequality elasticity of growth
is negative. There is, however, reason to doubt the congruency of this rela-
tionship. Hineline (2007) has found that estimated coeﬃcients of explana-
tory variables generally used in growth regression diﬀer substantially between
OECD and non-OECD countries. Barro (2000) has also found that the coeﬃ-
cient of inequality in growth regression may diﬀer between the income groups
of countries. Sensitivity analysis is thus needed to test the robustness of the
results. The sensitivity analysis is conducted using the method suggested in
section 3.2.
As explained in section 3.2, in order to study the elasticities of economic
growth with respect to explanatory variables separately in diﬀerent groups
of countries, the estimated equation must include group-related dummies
and group-related variables, and every group-related variable must have its
own group-related instrument.18 To estimate the elasticity of growth with
respect to inequality in OECD and non-OECD countries, the equation (2.1)
is transformed into:
log(growthit) = 1OECDi + 2NOECDi+ (3OECDi + 4NOECDi)log(GDPi;t−1)+ (5OECDi + 6NOECDi)log(investmenti;t−1) (2.3)+ (7OECDi + 8NOECDi)log(educationi;t−1)+ (9OECDi + 10NOECDi)log(inequalityi;t−1) + it
where OECD is a dummy variable for OECD economies, NOECD is a dummy
variable for non-OECD economies, and it is the residual, which includes
both the possible country-speciﬁc eﬀect, i, and the error term, it (i ∼
i:i:d:(0; 2u), it ∼ i:i:d:(0; 2)).
To estimate the elasticity of growth with respect to the Gini index in
18This means that, for example, if we have a group of OECD countries marked by dum-
mies, this group needs to have its own set of explanatory variables and their instruments
in the dataset.
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diﬀerent income groups of countries, equation (2.1) is transformed into:
log(growthit) = 1dri + 2dmi + 3dpi+ (4dri + 5dmi + 6dpi)log(GDPi;t−1)+ (7dri + 8dmi + 9dpi)log(investmenti;t−1) (2.4)+ (10dri + 11dmi + 12dpi)log(educationi;t−1)+ (13dri + 14dmi + 15dpi)log(inequalityi;t−1) + it
where dri is a dummy variable for rich economies, dmi is a dummy variable for
middle-income economies, dpi is a dummy variable for poor economies, and
it is the residual, which includes both the possible country-speciﬁc eﬀect,
i, and the error term, it (i ∼ i:i:d:(0; 2u), it ∼ i:i:d:(0; 2 )).
Table 2.5 shows the results of the non-linear Newey-West GMM estima-
tion of equations (2.3) and (2.4) for inequality. As before, the Newey-West
estimator is based on one lag. Group-related ﬁrst and second lags of ﬁrst
diﬀerences are used as instruments for group-related explanatory variables.
According to the Hansen’s J test, orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected
for the chosen set of instruments in all estimations (results not shown).
The magnitude of the eﬀect of inequality is quite diﬀerent between the
two measures in both OECD and non-OECD countries, although none of
the parameter estimates of the OECD and the non-OECD countries are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in either groups of countries. The
inequality elasticity of growth varies even more between the two measures
in income group estimation. The parameter estimates of the Deininger and
Squire (1996) Gini index are positive in the groups of countries whose GDP
per capita was under $1000 and over $2500 in 1965 and negative in the re-
maining income groups. However, the parameter estimate of the Gini index
is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in any of the income groups.
The eﬀect of inequality seems more robust across income groups when the
EHII2008 is used as a measure of inequality.19 The eﬀect is negative in all
income groups except in the group of countries whose GDP per capita was
19The diﬀerence between the measures may be due to sample selection as there are great
diﬀerences in the number of countries included in estimations between the two measures.
This diﬀerence could also result from small-sample bias in the GMM estimator or from
inconsistency in the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset.
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Table 2.5: Sensitivity analysis: GMM estimation on growth elasticity of in-
equality measures in selected groups of countries
Coeﬃcient of Standard
ineq. measure error Countries Observations
Whole sample D&S -0.0368 0.0416 34 103
Whole sample EHII2008 -0.0142* 0.0065 70 263
OECD D&S -0.0004 0.0033 15 103
non-OECD D&S -0.0065 0.0102 34 103
OECD EHII2008 -0.0043 0.0073 19 263
non-OECD EHII2008 -0.0156 0.0097 49 263
Income groups:
D&S:
<$500 -0.0137 0.0118 8 103
>$500 - <$2000 -0.0014 0.0042 13 103
>$2000 -0.0078 0.0101 13 103
D&S:
<$1000 0.0015 0.0052 11 103
>$1000 -<$2500 -0.0049 0.0044 14 103
>$2500 0.00001 0.0065 9 103
EHII2008:
<$500 -0.0230* 0.0098 18 263
>$500 - <$2000 -0.0109 0.0099 37 263
>$2000 -0.0031 0.0065 15 263
EHII2008:
<$1000 -0.0016 0.0120 33 263
>$1000 -<$2500 -0.0142* 0.0065 14 263
>$2500 0.0108 0.0073 9 263
* = p<.05. Countries denote the number of countries marked with dummy variables in the dataset. Ob-
servations gives the total number of observatios included in the estimation. D&S denotes the Gini index
by Deininger and Squire (1996) and the EHII2008 inequality measure by Galbraith and Kum (2006). Es-
timation of group-elasticities is done using group-related dummies and instruments in the whole dataset.
First and second lags of ﬁrst diﬀerence are used as instruments for explanatory variables in GMM estima-
tion. A Newey-West estimator with lag one is used as the GMM estimator’s weight matrix to account for
autocorrelation in the variables appearing in the orthogonality conditions.
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over $2500 in 1965. The parameter estimate is also statistically signiﬁcant in
the groups with GDP per capita under $500 and between $1000 and $2500
in 1965, but not in the group with GDP per capita under $1000 in 1965.
Results obtained using the EHII2008 inequality measure do thus indicate
that the relationship between income inequality and growth may be non-
linear, a ﬁnding which is quite well in line with those obtained with non- or
semi-parametric methods (Banerjee and Duﬂo 2003; Lin et al. 2006).
2.6 Conclusions
Our results show that the eﬀect of income inequality on economic growth
is statistically signiﬁcant and negative when using a new measure of income
distribution, the EHII2008 measure of inequality. However, group-related es-
timation revealed that although the negative eﬀect of inequality on growth
dominates, there are some non-linearities in the relationship.
Many previous studies have bypassed the problems in the commonly used
measure of income distribution, i.e. the Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini
index, mostly because there has been no other measure of income distri-
bution available. However, it is likely that Deininger and Squire’s dataset
contains inconsistencies such that all the results obtained using it are in
doubt. The EHII2008 inequality measure used in this study can be assumed
to be more consistent. The data coverage is also clearly extended compared
to Deininger and Squire’s data. Previous studies have usually only been able
to use data on 40-50 countries at most while we used information on 70 coun-
tries. Because of this, dynamic panel data estimations may have suﬀered from
small-sample bias in previous studies. We also included data on sub-Saharan
African economies, on which there was basically no data in Deininger and
Squire’s dataset.
Results may have been inﬂuenced by sample selection bias and measure-
ment error. Since, at its best, the data included only about one-third of
all the countries in the world, systematic errors may have inﬂuenced the
ﬁndings. The EHII2008 inequality measure is not an unﬂawed estimator of
income distribution either, because it is only a representation of statistical
summaries, like the Gini index. Thus, the level of inequality given by the
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EHII2008 inequality measure may not represent the true level of inequality
in the countries in question. It should also be noted that the results describe
only the short- or medium-term relationship between inequality and growth,
and the long-run relationship remains an open question.
In spite of these inevitable reservations, the present ﬁndings can be con-
sidered more reliable than those of many previous studies. This is mostly
due to inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the Gini index by Deininger and
Squire (1996). Use of the EHII2008 inequality measure also greatly increased
the data coverage thus diminishing the small sample bias and the possibil-
ity of systematic errors in estimation. In previous studies, the examination
of group-related growth elasticities of inequality by parametric methods was
also complicated by statistical obscurities. The use of group-related constants
in estimation is statistically dubious, and the asymptotic properties of esti-
mators suﬀer greatly where several parameters are estimated using only a
few dozen observations. However, as was shown here, the problems relating
to the use of country constants in panel data can be bypassed in a statistically
meaningful way by using a non-linear estimator.
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Table B.1: Country list
Algeria Italy
Australia Jamaica
Austria Japan
Bangladesh Jordan
Barbados Kenya
Belgium Malawi
Bolivia Malaysia
Cameroon Malta
Canada Mauritius
Central African Republic Mexico
Chile Netherlands
Colombia Nicaragua
Costa Rica Norway
Cyprus Pakistan
Denmark Panama
Dominican Republic Papua New Guinea
Ecuador Philippines
Egypt Poland
El Salvador Portugal
Fiji Senegal
Finland Singapore
France South Africa
Germany Spain
Ghana Sri Lanka
Greece Sweden
Haiti Syria
Honduras Taiwan
Hong Kong Togo
Hungary Tunisia
Iceland Turkey
India United Kingdom
Indonesia United States
Iran Uruguay
Ireland Venezuela
Israel Zimbabwe
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Chapter 3
Estimating the long-run
relationship between income
inequality and economic
development
Abstract1
There are several theories describing the eﬀect of income inequality on eco-
nomic growth. These theories usually predict that there exists some optimal,
steady-state growth path between inequality and development. This study
uses a new measure of income distribution and panel data cointegration
methods to test for the existence of such a steady-state equilibrium rela-
tion. It is shown that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between
the variables, and that this relationship is negative in developed economies.
1A paper based on this chapter is forthcoming in the Empirical Economics.
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3.1 Introduction
The decades long empirical research on the relationship between income in-
equality and economic development has produced controversial results, with
the direction and the statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of income inequal-
ity on economic growth changing between studies (e.g., Banerjee and Duﬂo
2003, Barro 2000, Chen 2003, Forbes 2000, Li and Zou 1998, Lin et al. 2006).
Theories have also generally been divided on the eﬀect of income inequality
on growth. The classical approach argues that saving rates are an increasing
function of wealth. In this case, inequality will increase incomes of the rich
whose marginal propensity to save is the highest. Thus, income inequality will
lead to faster capital accumulation (Kaldor 1957; Kuznets 1955; Smith 1776).
The political economy approach emphasizes the destabilizing eﬀect that in-
equality may have on the society (Benhabib and Rustichini 1996). According
to this view, equality will increase stability in the society and simulate in-
vestments and economic growth. The credit market imperfection approach
suggests that equality of incomes diminishes the eﬀect of credit-constraints
on human capital accumulation in developed economies (Galor and Moav
2004). Because credit-constraints become less binding in a developed econ-
omy where incomes are distributed evenly, equality of incomes will fasten the
accumulation of human capital and thus accelerate economic growth.
Despite of several theories describing the relationship between inequal-
ity and growth, the dependence between the variables over time remains an
open empirical question. Although we have observations on GDP from sev-
eral consecutive years, values of commonly used Gini indexes (e.g., the Gini
index by Deininger and Squire (1996)) have not been consistently measured
over time, which has made it virtually impossible to assess the possible time
dependence between the two variables. Some studies have tried to bypass
this problem by regressing the values of averaged growth rates of 20 years,
or more, on the values of the Gini index and other explanatory variables
in the ﬁrst year included in the averaging (Chen 2003; Forbes 2000). The
problem with this method is that these multi-decade averages lose a lot of
information and there is a risk of spurious parameter estimates. The observed
controversy in the relation between inequality and growth has also led some
to estimate the relation using non-parametric or semi-parametric methods
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(Banerjee and Duﬂo 2003; Frazer 2006; Lin et al. 2006). The advantages of
non-parametric methods are the fact that they can be used to estimate the
relation between variables in both short- and long-run and robustness. The
drawback of these methods is low statistical power compared to parametric
methods, especially in ﬁnite samples. Recently, Galbraith and Kum (2006)
have gathered a inequality measure dataset that has continuous observations
from several countries, which enables the use of panel data time series meth-
ods.
From time series analysis we know that, if variables are integrated pro-
cesses, we can learn about their long-run dependence by testing whether the
variables are cointegrated. If variables are found to be cointegrated, there ex-
ists a stationary distribution between them, and we can estimate this steady-
state relationship using standard estimation methods. Unfortunately, these
rules do not apply to panel data per se. The inference and estimation in panel
cointegrated data diﬀers from that in regular time series, because the asymp-
totic properties of the estimators in panel cointegrated regression models are
diﬀerent from those of time series cointegrated regression models (Baltagi
2008; Phillips and Moon 1999). The time series regression may, for exam-
ple, be spurious, while the panel regression utilising all cross-sections is not
(Phillips and Moon 1999). OLS estimator is also not asymptotically unbiased
in cointegrated panel data (Kao and Chiang 2000).
This study uses panel cointegration methods and improved data on in-
come inequality to assess the possible steady-state relationship between in-
come inequality and economic development. According to panel unit root
tests, both the logarithmic EHII2.1 inequality measure and the logarithmic
GDP series seem to follow an I(1) process in countries in question.2 They
are also found to be cointegrated of order one using panel cointegration tests
developed by Pedroni (2004) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006),
which implies that there is a long-run equilibrium relation between them.
The cointegrating coeﬃcient of the EHII2.1 inequality measure is estimated
with panel dynamic OLS and panel dynamic SUR estimators and it is found
to be negative. According to the income group estimations, this negative
2EHII=Estimated Household Income Inequality data set by University of Texas In-
equality Project.
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relationship is robust in middle-income and rich economies. Results for de-
veloping countries are inconclusive.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general theories
describing the causal relationship from income inequality to economic growth.
Section 3 presents the data and reports the results of panel unit root and
cointegration tests. Estimation details and results are given in section 4 and
section 5 concludes.
3.2 The main theoretical relationships between
inequality and growth
3.2.1 The income approach
In classical economic theory, inequality of incomes was assumed to inﬂuence
economic growth rates through savings and consumption. According to Smith
(1776), an increased division of labor raises productivity, but savings govern
capital accumulation, which enables production growth. When the saving
function is linear, e.g., si = myi + b, where yi is output per capita, m is the
marginal propensity to save, and b is the per capita savings at zero income,
aggregate saving behavior in an economy is not aﬀected by the distribution of
income (Stiglitz 1969). However, if the saving function is nonlinear, aggregate
savings become dependent on the distribution of income.
When the saving function is linear or concave, distribution of income
and wealth converge toward equality (Stiglitz 1969). If the saving function
is convex, i.e., the marginal propensity to save increases with income,3 un-
eqalitarian stationary distributions, or steady-state equilibriums, are Pareto
superior to egalitarian stationary distributions. This is because, in the case
of a convex saving function, more unequal distribution of income results
in higher capital intensity through greater aggregate savings. In these une-
galitarian steady-state equilibria, income and consumption for all individu-
als are greater than in egalitarian steady-state equilibria. In addition, in a
steady-state equilibrium, where income is distributed unevenly, the wealth
3The hypothesis of convex savings function is supported by empirical ﬁndings, see e.g.,
Dynan et al. (2004).
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of a nation is greater than in the steady-state equilibrium, where income is
distributed evenly. However, these steady-state equilibria exist only when all
individuals have positive wealth. Thus, result may not apply, for example, to
developing countries.4
3.2.2 The credit-market imperfections and combined ap-
proach
The income approach emphasizes the eﬀect of income inequality on savings
and on physical capital accumulation. Credit market imperfections approach
considers the eﬀect of income inequality on the accumulation of human cap-
ital (Galor and Zeira 1993). In a model by Galor and Moav (2004), the
engine of economic growth changes from physical capital to physical and hu-
man capital in the process of economic development. The process of economic
development is divided into two regimes, which have their own steady-state
growth paths.
Economies in the ﬁrst regime are underdeveloped, aggregate physical cap-
ital is small, and the rate of return to human capital is lower than the rate
of return to physical capital (Galor and Moav 2004). There are two types of
individuals in the economy: those who own the physical capital (the rich) and
those who do not (the poor). The poor consume their entire income (wages)
and are not engaged in saving and on capital accumulation. Thus, there is
a temporary steady-state equilibrium where the poor are in poverty trap
and the rich get richer. Inequality increases aggregate savings by increasing
the income of the rich and greater aggregate savings fuel physical capital
accumulation.5
In the second regime, physical capital accumulation by the rich has in-
4According to Keynes (1936), demand is the basis for investments and, because in-
equality lowers aggregate consumption, inequality of incomes will lead to slower economic
growth. This argument that inequality decreases consumption is valid, if the saving func-
tion is convex. In this case, aggregate demand diminishes when income becomes more
unequally distributed.
5In modern less developed economies, it is possible that also human capital drives
growth, if the capital and skill-biased technology is imported. In this case, the eﬀect of
inequality on growth would be mixed or negative (Galor and Moav 2004).
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creased the rate of return to human capital so high that it induces human
capital accumulation (Galor and Moav 2004). In this regime, both human and
physical capital are engines for economic development. Since individuals’ in-
vestment in human capital is subjected to diminishing marginal returns, the
return to human capital investments is maximized when investment in hu-
man capital is widely spread among the population. Because access to credit
is constrained, human capital investment is maximized when income in the
economy is distributed evenly. However, in a certain phase of economic de-
velopment income of every individual becomes so high that credit constraints
become less binding. In this locally stable steady-state equilibrium, the eﬀect
of inequality on growth becomes less signiﬁcant.
3.2.3 The political economy approach
Political economy models assume that preferences of individuals are aggre-
gated through political process. Therefore, redistribution of incomes and eco-
nomic growth are driven by the political process. Political process can be
driven by a median voter or by organized social groups. In the model by Per-
otti (1993), the equilibrium reached by the economy depends on the initial
distribution of income. If the aggregate capital in the economy is very small,
redistribution of income through taxes and subsidies will result in a poverty
trap where no one is able to acquire education. In this case, more unequal dis-
tribution of income will help the economy because in that case at least some
individuals can acquire education and increase the level of human capital
in the economy. As economy becomes more developed, very unequal income
distribution may diminish growth because the accumulation of more human
capital would require that middle-income and poor individuals acquire ed-
ucation, as the rich have already educated themselves. In an rich economy,
only the poor may increase the level of human capital in the economy and
higher steady-state growth path requires that income is distributed evenly.
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3.3 Time series analysis of panel data
The theoretical models presented above predict steady-state equilibrium re-
lations, or stationary distributions, that may exist between income inequality
and the evolution of output. The estimation of these theoretical stationary
distributions requires that we know the time series features of the variables
in the model. Many models also assume that income distribution and eco-
nomic development are determined endogenously, which has to be taken into
account in the estimation.6
3.3.1 Data
Data for this study consist at 3 variables: real GDP per capita, Estimated
Household Income Inequality (EHII) 2.1 measure, and portion of investments
on GDP. Gross domestic product is stated in real terms with the base year
of 1996. Investments are gross investments as a portion of GDP. The data
on GDP and investments are from Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2006).
The EHII2.1 measure of inequality is from the University of Texas Inequality
Project (Galbraith and Kum 2006).
Many of the previous studies made on the relationship between income
inequality and economic growth have used the Gini index constructed by
Deininger and Squire (1996) as a measure on income distribution.7 The main
reason why so many researchers have relied on the Deininger and Squire’s
Gini index has been its alleged "high quality". However, as pointed out by
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001, p. 780), Deininger and Squire’s dataset in-
cludes so many diﬀerent datasets that in many cases it would be "highly
misleading to regard Deininger and Squire’s "high quality" estimates as a
continuous series". The diﬀerent country-related datasets in Deininger and
Squire’s "high quality" dataset may also not be comparable with each other.
These are serious problems for estimation, because the statistical inference
requires that observations are from the same parent population. If the obser-
6Bénabou (2005) has actually suggested that endogeneity of income inequality in growth
regressions is the primary reason for the observed controversy in empirical growth studies.
7These include Barro (2000), Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003), Forbes (2000), and Chen
(2003).
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vations are not comparable, there is no one coherent parent population and
the parameter estimates may be spurious.
Many scholars studying income inequality have already switched to Gini
index provided by UNU-Wider.8 Although UNU-Wider Gini is likely to be
more consistent and accurate than Deininger and Squire’s Gini index, they
share one deﬁciency. Both Gini indexes are unevenly distributed through
time, which restricts their use in time series analysis. However, Galbraith
and Kum (2006) have gathered a EHII2.1 inequality measure, which has a
consistent, long time series for several countries.
Galbraith and Kum (2006) have build their measure of inequality "on
top" of the Gini index by Deininger and Squire (1996), a method that has
been suggested by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). Galbraith and Kum have
obtained their inequality measure by regressing Deininger and Squire’s Gini
coeﬃcients on the values of explanatory variables, which include the diﬀerent
income measures of Deininger and Squire’s data set, the set of measures of
the dispersion of pay in the manufacturing sector, and the manufacturing
share of the population. According to Galbraith and Kum, the EHII2.1 in-
equality measure has three clear advantages over the Deininger and Squire’s
Gini index. It has more than 3000 estimates, while Deininger and Squire
have only about 700 "high quality" estimates. The EHII2.1 gets its accuracy
from the Industrial data published annually by the United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization (UNIDO). This way changes over time and
diﬀerences across countries in pay dispersion are reﬂected in income inequal-
ity. All estimates are also adjusted to household gross income, which makes
them more congruent. Values of the EHII2.1 also correspond to the estimates
of income distributions of other research institutes, such as the OECD and
the UNU-Wider, better than those of the Deininger and Squire’s Gini index
(Föster and Pearson 2003; Galbraith and Kum 2006).
3.3.2 Unit root testing
There are 60 countries in the EHII2.1 dataset where the time series of in-
equality measure is consistent and at least 20 years long. After individual
8World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations Univer-
sity.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
variable mean std. deviation min. max.
GDP 6624.25 6750.15 145.24 32766.51
GDP growth (%) 6.498 5.692 -27.032 72.860
EHII2.1 inequality 39.713 6.520 23.074 58.975
investments (%) 18.112 8.664 0.191 52.531
unit root tests, 7 countries were discarded from the set because their series
of the EHII2.1 inequality measure or GDP did not seem to follow a I(1)
process according to the ADF-test.9 Descriptive statistics of the remaining
53 countries are presented in table 1 and a list of the 53 countries is presented
in the appendix.
Most of the time series analysis methods for panel data assume that there
is no cross-unit correlation present in the panel. When dealing with economic
variables, this restriction is quite uncomfortable, because for example busi-
ness cycles do transfer to neighboring countries quite easily in modern open
economies. To account for the obvious cross-sectional correlation present in
the data, the results of panel unit root test allowing for cross-sectional de-
pendence are also reported (Pesaran 2007). Pesaran’s test accounts for cross-
sectional correlation by introducing common factors. This method captures a
linear cross-sectional dependence, where there can be several common factors
between the tested series of the panel.
The panel unit root tests used in this study assume two diﬀerent types
of unit root processes. Test by Levin et al. (2002) (LLC) assumes a common
unit root process, i.e., that all the countries in the dataset have the same
unit root. Test by Im et al. (2003) (IPS), Fisher type ADF and PP tests,
presented by Maddala and Wu (1999), and test by Pesaran (2007) allow for
individual unit root processes. That is, they allow the coeﬃcient of unit root
9This is a precautionary method. Karlsson and Löfgren (2000) have studied how few
stationary series in the panel can alter the results of panel unit root tests. They found
that when the time dimension of a dataset is long, small fraction of stationary series in
the dataset results to high power and vice versa. Therefore, there is a risk that panels
with large T would erroneously be modeled as stationary and panels with small T as
non-stationary.
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to diﬀer across countries. A more detailed discussion about the used panel
unit root tests is provided in the appendix.
Summary of the results of the ﬁve panel unit root tests are presented
in table 3.2.10 Individual trends and constants are included in the tests for
GDP and inequality. For GDP it is natural to allow for both individual time
trends and constants, because the time series of GDP usually follows a clear
upward trend. The time series of inequality also seems to be trending in many
countries,11 and so it is also allowed to have individual time trends. GDP
growth and investments seem not to exhibit a trend, and so only individual
constants are included in their tests.12 All other tests use the unbalanced
panel data of 53 countries,13 except Pesaran’s test where a balanced panel of
38 countries with 25 yearly observations is used.14 Summary tables (years and
countries included) of the diﬀerent datasets can be found in the appendix.
According to all ﬁve tests, the logarithmic GDP and inequality seem to
follow a I(1) process, and the series of GDP growth and investments seem
to be stationary.15 However, as mentioned above, it is likely that at least
some of the tested series are cross-sectionally correlated. This would violate
the assumption of uncorrelated residuals among cross-sections. Banerjee et
al. (2005) have studied the eﬀect of the violation of the assumption of no
cross-unit cointegration on rejection frequencies of the null hypothesis. Their
results show that in the presence of cross-unit cointegration, the ADF, PP,
and IPS tests grossly overreject the null hypothesis of unit root with small
time (T ) and relatively large cross-sectional (n) dimensions of data. Accord-
ing to all these tests, the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected in
series of inequality and GDP. As Pesaran’s test also does not reject the null
10All tests were performed with Eviews 6, except Pesaran’s test which was done with
Stata. Lag lengths have been determined using Schwarts information criterion, spectral
estimation has been conducted with Bartlett kernel and bandwidth has been selected using
Newey-West method.
11The time series were inspected visually.
12If individual trends are included, the results change only marginally and both series
are still stationary according to all ﬁve tests.
13Panel unit root test were also conducted using the whole dataset of 60 countries.
Results were similar to those presented in table 3.2.
14Pesaran’s test requires that the panel is balanced.
15Results were the same when original data of 60 countries are used.
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Table 3.2: Panel unit root tests
variable LLC IPS ADF PP Pesaran*
log(GDP) 9.068 15.092 15.855 16.072 0.709
(1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.761)
GDP growth -45.913 -25.415 572.04 599.36 -12.089
(<.0001) (<0.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
log(inequality) 0.549 2.702 77.387 70.521 -0.790
(0.7085) (0.9966) (0.9834) (0.9968) (0.215)
log(investments) -6.071 -7.558 244.13 212.80 -4.529
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
The p-values of the test statistics are presented in parentheses. All tests include individual
eﬀects and trends except the test for GDP growth and investments which include only
individual eﬀects. Lag lengths were determined using Schwarts information criterion. All
other tests use unbalanced panel of 53 countries except Pesaran’s test, where the panel is
balanced including 38 countries and 25 yearly observations.
hypothesis for inequality and GDP, they seem very likely to be unit root
processes.16 Because Pesaran’s test also ﬁnds GDP per capita growth and
investments to be stationary, it seems that cross-sectional correlation has
not biased the results of traditional unit root tests. Thus, these series are
assumed to be stationary.
3.3.3 Cointegration tests
The possible cointegration between inequality and GDP is tested with panel
cointegration test developed by Pedroni (2004), which consist of 11 diﬀerent
test statistics.17 To allow for possible cross-sectional dependence present in
the panel, cointegration is also tested with a test developed by Banerjee and
16First diﬀerenced series are stationary according to all panel unit root tests. GDP and
inequality thus seem to be I(1).
17There are 7 diﬀerent test statistics, but Eviews 6 gives also the results of weighted
test statistics on the ﬁrst four tests. Tests statistics include the panel versions of PP and
ADF tests, a form of the average of the Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) test statistics (),
and panel variance ratio statistics (v).
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Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006). A more detailed discussion about these tests is
provided in the appendix.
Pedroni’s panel cointegration test
The model for testing for cointegration between inequality and GDP is:
log(GDPit) = i + it+ ilog(inequalityit)+ ilog(investmentsit)+ it; (3.1)
where the changes in GDP are explained by the changes in inequality and on
the level of investments, and (1;−i) is the individual cointegration vector
between inequality and GDP. Results of Pedroni’s panel cointegration tests
on equation (3.1) are presented in table 3.3.18
According to all of the 11 test statistics presented in table 3.3, the series
of inequality and GDP are cointegrated at the 5% level. The test is also
conducted using only the inequality as an explanatory variable for GDP.
In this case, 9 of the 11 test statistics ﬁnd the GDP and inequality to be
cointegrated.19
If the test is conducted using only investments as an explanatory variable,
all of the 11 test statistics ﬁnd the investments and GDP to be cointegrated.
This indicates that there might be cross-sectional cointegration relations in
the panel of investments, which may have aﬀected on the results of panel
unit root tests. Cross-unit cointegration can bias the results of panel unit
root tests towards type I error, i.e., that hypothesis of unit root is rejected
far too often (Banerjee et al. 2005; Breitung and Pesaran 2008). If series are
cross-sectionally cointegrated, the common trends present in the data may be
identiﬁed as common factors in unit root tests that model the cross-sectional
correlation through common factors, like the Pesaran’s test, and removed
from the analysis (Breitung and Pesaran 2008). In this case, if the remaining
idiosyncratic component is stationary, the panel unit root test has a ten-
dency to present the time series as stationary when panel units are actually
nonstationary. So, although all panel unit root tests found the investments
18The test was conducted with Eviews 6.
19If the original data of 60 countries is used, 8 of the 11 tests ﬁnd the GDP and inequality
to be cointegrated.
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Table 3.3: Pedroni’s panel cointegration test statistics for log(GDP) and
log(inequality)
Within-dimension
statistic prob. weight. statistic prob.
panel v-statistic 49.309 <.0001 44.793 <.0001
panel -statistic 7.152 <.0001 7.329 <.0001
panel PP-statistic 2.888 0.0062 3.494 0.0009
panel ADF-statistic 2.489 0.0180 3.039 0.0039
Between-dimension
statistic prob.
group -statistic 9.417 <.0001
group PP-statistic 4.555 <.0001
group ADF-statistic 2.313 0.0275
countries 53
observations 1961
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration between variables. Within-dimension
tests presuppose common AR coeﬃcients among cross sections. Between-dimension tests
presuppose individual AR coeﬃcients. Lag lengths were determined with Schwarz infor-
mation criterion. Spectral estimation was done with Bartlett method and bandwidth was
selected with Newey-West method.
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to be I(0), the possibility that investments is actually I(1) process that is
cointegrated with GDP has to be taken into account in estimation.20
Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s cointegration test
As with panel unit root tests, the presence of cross-sectional dependency may
have aﬀected the results of cointegration tests. There may also be structural
breaks in the relation between inequality and GDP. To account for possi-
ble cross-sectional dependence and structural breaks in the relation between
inequality and GDP, cointegration is also tested with the panel cointegra-
tion test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006). Banerjee and
Carrion-i-Silvestre’s test allows for cross-sectional dependence by introducing
common factors in the estimated model.
Table 3.4 reports the results of Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre’s panel
cointegration test between inequality and GDP using the dataset of 38 coun-
tries with 25 yearly observations. The test allows for level and cointegration
vector shifs.21
According to the basic model allowing just time trend in the tested series,
inequality and GDP would be cointegrated. If level and slope trend shift are
allowed, only  test ﬁnds the variables to be cointegrated at the 5% level. If
both time trend and cointegration vector shifts are allowed,  test ﬁnds the
variables to be cointegrated at 0.01% level and the t test ﬁnds the variables
to be cointegrated at the 10%level.
Thus, inequality and GDP seem to be cointegrated even when possible
structural breaks in the relation and the possible cross-sectional correlation
present in the panel are taken into account. When cointegration relation-
ship includes structural breaks, cointegration tests tend to be biased towards
accepting the null hypothesis of no cointegration, whereas cross-sectional
correlation tends to bias the results towards rejecting the null (Banerjee and
20The cointegration between log(GDP) and log(inequality), and log(GDP) and
log(investments) were also tested with Johansen’s combined Fisher panel cointegration
test developed by Maddala and Wu (1999). According to it, both GDP and inequality and
GDP and investments are cointegrated of order one. Detailed results are available upon
request.
21Estimation done with Gauss. We are grateful to Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing the
program code.
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Table 3.4: Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s cointegration test for log(GDP)
and log(inequality)
Pedroni model with a time trend
statistic p-value
Zt^NT (^) -6.434 <.0001
Z^NT (^) -7.122 <.0001
Model with level shift
statistic p-value
Zt^NT (^) -1.256 0.1046
Z^NT (^) -3.913 <.0001
Model with coint. vector shift
statistic p-value
Zt^NT (^) -1.619 0.0527
Z^NT (^) -5.992 <.0001
countries 38
observations 950
Model with level shift includes time trend and a level and slope trend shift. Model with a
cointegrating vector shift includes time trend and cointegration vector shifts.
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Carrion-i-Silvestre 2006; Banerjee et al. 2004). Results presented in table G.2
imply that cross-sectional correlation and/or structural breaks in the relation
between inequality and GDP have not biased the result of Pedroni’s panel
cointegration tests presented in table 3.3.
3.4 Estimation of the cointegrating coeﬃcient
of inequality
3.4.1 Estimation and inference in cointegrated panels
Conventional limit theorems assume one index (n or T ) to pass to inﬁnity.
The limit theory for panels with large cross-sectional (n) and time (T ) dimen-
sions needs to allow both indexes to pass to inﬁnity. This has some profound
eﬀects for estimators. For example, the OLS estimator is not asymptotically
unbiased, and the standard GMM estimator is inconsistent for panel cointe-
grated data (Kao and Chiang 2000).
Several estimators for cointegrated panel data have been proposed. Prob-
ably the most commonly used estimators have been the fully-modiﬁed OLS
(FM-OLS) proposed by Phillips and Moon (1999) and Pedroni (2000), and
the dynamic OLS (DOLS) proposed by Kao and Chiang (2000). The major
problem for estimators in cointegrated panel data has been the modeling of
simultaneous cross-sectional and time series dependence (Phillips and Moon
1999). This is a problem in this study, because it is likely that, at least, GDP
series are correlated or even cointegrated across the panel. Mark and Sul
(2003) have developed a version of DOLS estimator that allows for simul-
taneous cross-sectional and time series dependence. It uses a common time
eﬀect to control for cross-sectional dependency.22
22Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) have compared the performance of diﬀerent types of
estimators for panel cointegrated data. They found that Mark and Sul’s DOLS system
estimator (panel DOLS) performs best in the case of cross-unit correlation or cointegration
compared to several other estimators developed for panel cointegrated data. The tested
estimators included FM-OLS presented by Phillips and Moon (1999), DOLS presented
by Kao and Chiang (2000) and Mark and Sul (2003), one-step VAR, and two-step VAR
presented by Breitung (2005).
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It is, of course, possible that the common time-eﬀect cannot capture all
the cross-sectional correlation present in the data. In this case, a panel dy-
namic seemingly unrelated regression estimator developed by Mark et al.
(2005) can be used to fully account for the cross-sectional dependence. Panel
DSUR estimator can be used when the cross-section is small relative to time
series. A more detailed discussion about panel DOLS and DSUR estimators
can be found in the appendix.
3.4.2 Estimation results
The estimated model includes a measure of physical capital accumulation
(investments) and a measure of income inequality (EHII2.1). Panel DOLS
estimation is used to estimate the following equation:
log(GDPit) = i + ′1log(investmentsit) + ′2log(inequalityit)++it + t + uit; (3.2)
where i are individual constant, it are individual trends, t is the common
time eﬀect, (1;−′1;−′2) is a cointegrating vector between GDP, investments
and inequality, and uit is a idiosyncratic error. Table 3.5 presents the results
of ﬁxed eﬀects DOLS estimation of equation (3.2).23
The cointegrating coeﬃcient of investments is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all estimations. The cointegrating coeﬃcient
of inequality is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all
estimations using the dataset with 37 yearly observations. In estimations
using the dataset with 25 yearly observations, the cointegrating coeﬃcient
of inequality is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level when two and
three leads and lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerences are used as instruments for the
explanatory variables.
Thus, the results of panel DOLS estimation using the 15 country dataset
with longer time dimension imply that the long-run growth elasticity with
respect to income inequality would be negative. However, the results of panel
DOLS estimation using the 38 country dataset with shorter time dimension
are inconclusive.
23Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing
the program code on his homepage.
83
Table 3.5: DOLS estimates of the cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.2199*** 0.0954*
(0.0402) (0.0455)
log(inequality) -0.1836*** -0.0678**
(0.0252) (0.0217)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.1851*** 0.1852***
(0.0447) (0.0433)
log(inequality) -0.2427*** -0.0632
(0.0287) (0.0290)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=3)
log(investments) 0.1281*** 0.3847***
(0.0488) (0.0384)
log(inequality) -0.3069*** -0.0375
(0.0297) (0.0194)
countries 15 38
years 1963-99 1972-96
observations 816 950
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are
presented in parentheses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s
Pre-whitening method. Inclusion of individual constants means that all estimations are
made with ﬁxed eﬀects. Leads & lags=1 means that ﬁrst lags and leads of ﬁrst diﬀerences
of explanatory variables are used as instruments. Leads & lags=2 means that ﬁrst and
second leads and lags of ﬁrst diﬀerences are used as instruments, etc.
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3.4.3 Estimation of income group-related elasticities of
growth
Recently, Hineline (2008) has found that the estimated coeﬃcients of ex-
planatory variables generally used in growth regressions diﬀer substantially
between OECD and non-OECD countries. Panel cointegration tests by Pe-
droni (2004) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) also allowed for
individual cointegrating coeﬃcients between countries. It is therefore pos-
sible that the cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality may diﬀer in diﬀerent
groups of countries. However, none of the theories presented in section 2
imply that there would be diﬀerences in the growth elasticity of income in-
equality between OECD and non-OECD countries. What they do imply is
that the growth elasticity of inequality might diﬀer between developing and
developed economies.
To estimate the long-run growth elasticities of income inequality and
physical capital accumulation in diﬀerent income groups, countries in the
dataset are divided into three income groups. To make the estimation of in-
come groups asymptotically feasible, i.e., to make the groups large enough,
countries are divided into three equally sized groups. This is done using all
the countries in the 53 country dataset that have observations on GDP in
1972. There are 48 such countries in the dataset of 53 countries and so we
have 3 groups of 16 countries. The thresholds for these groups become: GDP
per capita under $1270 in 1972 for less developed countries, GDP per capita
between $1271 and $3715 in 1972 for middle-income countries, and GDP per
capita above $3715 in 1972 for rich countries. Table 10 presents the results
of panel DOLS estimation of equation (3.2) in diﬀerent income groups of
countries.24
The cointegrating coeﬃcient of investments is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant in all income groups, when three leads and lags are used as instru-
ments. The cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level in middle-income and rich economies in all estima-
tions. In less developed economies, the cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality
24Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing
the program code on his homepage.
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Table 3.6: DOLS estimates of the cointegrating coeﬃcients of inequality in
diﬀerent income groups
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
less developed middle-income rich
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.1766*** 0.1000* -0.0018
(0.0366) (0.0496) (0.0974)
log(inequality) -0.0069 -0.1317* -0.1443*
(0.0190) (0.0559) (0.0627)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.2678*** 0.0803 0.0919
(0.0583) (0.0543) (0.0742)
log(inequality) 0.0549* -0.1520*** -0.2417***
(0.0238) (0.0299) (0.0490)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=3)
log(investments) 0.4492*** 0.2667*** 0.1962**
(0.0366) (0.0397) (0.0596)
log(inequality) 0.1014*** -0.2175*** -0.4558***
(0.0152) (0.0397) (0.0424)
countries 11 12 15
years 1972-96 1972-96 1972-96
observations 275 300 375
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s Pre-whitening method. All
estimations include individual constants, individual trends, and common time eﬀects.
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is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level when two and three
leads and lags are used as instruments.
The results of table 3.6 have two implications. The elasticity of growth
with respect to investments, i.e., physical capital accumulation, diminishes
in accordance with the level of economic development and the elasticity of
growth with respect to income inequality changes in the process of economic
development. In early stages of economic development, the eﬀect of income
inequality on growth is positive, but turns negative as the economy becomes
more developed. The negative growth elasticity of inequality also increases
in accordance with the level of economic development.
However, panel DOLS may be biased if there remains correlation between
equilibrium error and leads and lags of instrumental variables of diﬀerent
cross-sections (see appendix C). In this case the panel DOLS exhibits the
same form of second order asymptotic bias as pooled OLS (Mark and Sul
2003). To account for this possible cross-equational correlation, the panel
DSUR estimator is applied to income group estimation. Because panel DSUR
requires that the time series dimension is clearly larger than cross-sectional
dimension, a dataset that has 34 yearly observations on 24 countries is used.
This dataset spans from 1963 to 1996. Grouping of countries is done in the
same way as presented above. There are 44 countries in the dataset of 53
countries that have observations on real GDP per capita in 1963. Thus,
33% of all countries would give 14.6 countries per group. Because of this,
14 countries are included in the groups of less developed and rich countries
and 16 countries to the group of middle-income countries. The thresholds
for these groups become: GDP per capita under $637 in 1963 for less de-
veloped economies, GDP per capita between $638 and $1903 in 1963 for
middle-income economies, and GDP per capita over $1903 in 1963 for rich
economies. Table 3.7 gives the results of panel dynamic SUR estimation of
equation (3.2) in diﬀerent income groups.25
According to the results presented in table 3.7, the cointegrating coeﬃ-
cient of investments is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
in less developed and middle-income countries.26 The cointegrating coeﬃ-
25Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing
the program code on his homepage.
26Estimations were also done with three leads and lags, but as there were no major
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Table 3.7: DSUR estimates of the cointegrating coeﬃcients of inequality in
diﬀerent income groups
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
less developed middle-income rich
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.1532*** 0.1296*** 0.0068
(0.0309) (0.0345) (0.0114)
log(inequality) -0.1567*** -0.1700*** -0.1187***
(0.0208) (0.0282) (0.0069)
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.1841*** 0.0843*** -0.0151
(0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0092)
log(inequality) -0.1337*** -0.1622*** -0.1216***
(0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0071)
countries 7 6 11
years 1963-96 1963-96 1963-96
observations 238 204 374
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors are estimated using parametric correction. All estimations include individual
constants, individual trends, and common time eﬀects.
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cient of investments is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in any of
the estimations of rich countries. The elasticity of growth with respect to
investments also gets smaller as countries get richer. This implies that the
inﬂuence of investments on per capita growth diminishes as the level of phys-
ical capital increases. The cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%level in all income groups.27
It is unexpected that the cointegrating coeﬃcient of investments is not
positive and statistically signiﬁcant in rich economies. However, DSUR esti-
mator assumes that the cointegration rank is 1. Because estimated equation
includes two explanatory I(1) variables, there may be two cointegrating vec-
tors. If equation (3.2) is estimated with DSUR using only investments as a
explanatory variable in rich economies, the cointegrating coeﬃcient of invest-
ments is positive (the value of the cointegrating coeﬃcient is about 0.01) and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.28 If equation (3.2) is estimated using
inequality as the only explanatory variable, the cointegrating coeﬃcients of
inequality changes only marginally compared to the results presented in table
3.7.
As such, results presented in table 3.7 contradict the results of panel
DOLS estimation, where the cointegrating coeﬃcient of the inequality was
positive and statistically signiﬁcant in less developed economies when two
and three leads and lags were used as instruments. This could result from
cross-sectional correlation not captured by the common time eﬀect, from
correlation between equilibrium error and cross-equations, from eﬃciency of
panel DSUR compared to panel DOLS, or from sample selection bias. To test
this, both estimators are used to estimate model (3.2) using the dataset with
34 yearly observations. Results of estimations are presented in table 3.8.
According to the results, the cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality is not
statistically signiﬁcant in less developed economies, when panel DOLS esti-
mator is used, and negative and statistically signiﬁcant, when panel DSUR
changes in the results, only results of estimations with one and two leads and lags are
presented here.
27Equation 3.2) was also estimated using only the data on 6 of the most developed
countries. Results were similar to those presented in table 3.7.
28The cointegrating coeﬃcient of investments remains more or less the same when esti-
mation in other income groups is done using only investments as a explanatory variable.
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Table 3.8: DOLS and DSUR estimates of the cointegrating coeﬃcients of
inequality in diﬀerent income groups
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
less developed middle-income rich
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.263* 0.180*** 0.136***
(0.116) (0.047) (0.043)
log(inequality) -0.101 -0.120*** -0.057
(0.066) (0.038) (0.030)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.420* 0.162*** 0.068
(0.144) (0.040) (0.061)
log(inequality) -0.106 -0.112*** -0.108***
(0.070) (0.032) (0.035)
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.1532*** 0.1296*** 0.0068
(0.0309) (0.0345) (0.0114)
log(inequality) -0.1567*** -0.1700*** -0.1187***
(0.0208) (0.0282) (0.0069)
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.1841*** 0.0843*** -0.0151
(0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0092)
log(inequality) -0.1337*** -0.1622*** -0.1216***
(0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0071)
countries 7 6 11
years 1963-96 1963-96 1963-96
observations 238 204 374
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors are estimated using parametric correction. All estimations include individual
constants, individual trends, and common time eﬀects.
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is used. The diﬀerence between the estimation results presented in tables
3.6 and 3.8 imply that the estimation results of less developed economies
might be driven by the sample selection. However, it is also possible that
the diﬀerence results from bias in the DOLS estimator caused by correlation
in cross-equations. Unfortunately, due to the limited extent of the data this
issue cannot be solved here and this question needs to be addressed further
in future research.
There are no major diﬀerences in results of middle-income and rich economies
compared to results presented in table 3.6. Thus, the results obtained for
middle-income and rich countries seem to be robust across samples.
3.5 Conclusions
The results show that the distribution of income and economic develop-
ment seem to have a steady-state equilibrium relation, or relations, as com-
monly predicted by theoretical models. According to estimations, this long-
run growth elasticity of income inequality is negative in middle-income and
rich economics. Estimation results also indicate that the long-run growth
elasticity of inequality may diﬀer between less developed economies.
There are (at least) three reservations that have to be attached to the
results: the highly simpliﬁed production function, the time dimension, and
the extent of the data used in estimation. The production function used in
estimation included only two inputs, namely physical capital and income in-
equality. It was assumed that the coeﬃcient of inequality reﬂects the eﬀect of
human capital on production growth. However, it is likely that the observed
eﬀect of income inequality reﬂects the economic eﬀects of several other vari-
ables as well. It has been shown that income inequality may, in addition to
human capital, have an eﬀect on several variables, e.g., social capital, ag-
gregate savings, and social stability. Controlling for all these variables could
result in biased coeﬃcient of inequality, because the coeﬃcient would not
represent the aggregate eﬀect of income inequality but only a partial eﬀect.
Thus, it may be feasible not to try to control the diﬀerent channels through
which income inequality may aﬀect growth.
Panel cointegration methods have made it possible to test for cointegra-
91
tion using only a handful of time series observations. This has brought about
a dilemma. If only a few dozen time series observations are needed for cointe-
gration testing, what is the time dimension after which the relationship can be
described as a long-run relation? It was assumed here that a "lower bound"
for long-run relationship is one generation (25 to 30 yearly observations).
Some may argue that, economically, this does not constitute long-run. How-
ever, theories describing the eﬀect of inequality on growth predict that there
may be temporary steady-state equilibria between them at diﬀerent stages
of economic development. As results presented here indicate that countries
in question seem to be, at least, in their temporary steady-state equilibria
within this period, it seems that one generation could be considered long-run
in this setting.
The dataset used in estimation was fairly small including only 38 countries
at maximum. There were also only few less developed countries included in
group-related estimations. Due to this, the results on poor countries remain
inconclusive, but the data on developed economies was far more comprehen-
sive. In rich economies, estimation results validated the general ﬁnding of the
theories describing the relationship between income inequality and growth.
That is, income inequality is associated with lower long-run economic growth
in rich economies.
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Appendix C
Panel unit root tests
The traditional panel unit root tests used in this study are based on the
following regression:
△yit = iyi;t−1 + i + it + t + it; (C.1)
where i are the individual constants, it are the individual time trends, and t
is the common time eﬀect. All tests rely on the assumption that E[itjs] = 0∀ t; s and i ≠ j, which is required for the calculation of common time eﬀects.
The inclusion of individual constants and time trends is also optional.
The null hypothesis in all tests isH0 ∶ i = 0 ∀ i, but the tests have diﬀerent
assumptions about the heterogeneity of  and on the alternative hypothesis.
Im et al. (2003), Fisher type ADF and PP tests, and Pesaran (2007) tests
introduced below allow for individual processes. Their alternative hypothesis
is that some but not all of the individual series may have unit roots. Levin
et al. (2002) test, on the other hand, assumes a common unit root process,
i.e., i =  ∀ i.
The test by Pesaran (2007) is based on a regression
△yit = yi;t−1 + it + i + it + it; (C.2)
where i are the individual constants, it are the individual time trends, t
is the common time eﬀect, whose coeﬃcients, i, are assumed to be non-
stochastic and they measure the impact of the common time eﬀect on series
i, it ∼ i:i:d:N(0; 2) over t, and it is independent of js and s for all i ≠ j and
s; t. Cross-sectional dependence is allowed through the common time eﬀects
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which are proxied by the cross-section mean of yit (yt = n−1nj=1yjt) and its
lagged values, yt−1, yt−2, etc. The null hypothesis is that H0 ∶ i = 0 ∀ i and
alternative hypothesis allows for some of the tested series to be nonstationary.
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Appendix D
Pedroni’s and Banerjee &
Carrion-i-Silvestre’s panel
cointegration tests
Panel cointegration test developed by Pedroni (2004) is based on the model:
yit = i + it + iXit + it; (D.1)
where i:s and i:s allow for member speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and deterministic
trends, Xit is a m-dimensional column vector of explanatory variables for
each member i, and i is an m-dimensional row vector for each member i.
The data generating process is described as a partitioned vector z′it ≡(yit;Xit) where the true process is generated as zit = zi;t−1 + it,  ′it = (yitXit )
(Pedroni 2004). 1√
T
∑[Tr]t=1 it is assumed to converge to a vector Brownian
motion with asymptotic covariance of 
i as T Ð→∞. The individual process
is assumed to be i:i:d: so that E[it ′js] = 0 ∀s; t; i ≠ j.
Let e^it denote the estimated residuals of (D.1) and 
^i the consistent
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estimator of 
i. The 7 test statistics can now be deﬁned as :
Zv^NT ≡ (Ni=1Tt=1L^−211ie^2i;t−1)−1 ;
Z^NT−1 ≡ (Ni=1Tt=1L^−211ie^2i;t−1)1Ni=1Tt=1L^−211i(e^i;t−1e^it − ^i;
Zt^NT ≡ (~2NTNi=1Tt=1L^−211ie^2i;t−1)−1Ni=1Tt=1L^−211i(e^i;t−1e^it − ^i);
Zt^NT ≡ (~s∗2NTNi=1Tt=1L^−211ie^∗2i;t−1)−1Ni=1Tt=1L^−211i(e^∗i;t−1e^∗it − ^i);
~Z^NT−1 ≡ Ni=1 (Tt=1e^2i;t−1)−1Tt=1(e^i;t−1e^it − ^i);
~Zt^NT ≡ Ni=1 (^2iTt=1e^2i;t−1)−1/2Tt=1(e^i;t−1e^it − ^i);
~Z ∗^
tNT
≡ Ni=1 (Tt=1s^∗2i e^∗2i;t−1)−1/2Tt=1(e^∗i;t−1e^∗it);
where L−211i = 
^11i − 
^′21i
^−122i
^21i, ^i = 1/Tkis=1 (1 − s/(ki + 1))Tt=s+1^it^i;t−s,
s^2i ≡ 1/TTt=1^2it, ^i = s^2i + 2^i, ~2NT ≡ 1/NNi=1L^−211i^2i , s^∗2i ≡ 1/tTt=1^∗2it , ~s∗2NT ≡
1/NNi=1s^∗2i , L^211i = 1/TTt=1#^2it+2/Tkis=1 (1 − s/(k − i + 1))Tt=s+1#^i; #^i;t−s. The
residuals ^it; ^∗it and #^it are attained from regressions: e^it = ^e^i;t−1 + ^it, e^it =
^ie^i;t−1+K−ik=1 ^ike^i;t−k+ ^∗it, yit = Mm=1b^mixmi;t = #^it. (Pedroni 1999, 2004)
The ﬁrst 4 statistics are constructed by pooling the data by its within
dimension (Pedroni 2004). Here the numerator and denominator terms are
summed separately for the analogous conventional time series statistics. The
last 3 statistics pool the between dimension of the panel. These statistics
are constructed by computing the ratio of the corresponding conventional
time series statistics and then by computing the standardized sum of the
N time series of the panel. In the weighted statistics presented in table 3,
the numerator and denominator of the panel statistics are weighted by the
member speciﬁc long-run conditional variances. Pedroni (1999, 2004) shows
that under the null of no cointegration the asymptotic distributions of the
7 statistics presented above and the weighted statistics converge to normal
distributions with zero mean and variance of one as N and T sequentially
converge to inﬁnity.
Panel cointegration test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006)
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is based on a model:
yi;t = fi(t) + x′i;t + ui;t;△xi;t = vi;t;
fi(t) = i + it + DUi;t + iDT ∗i;t;
uit = F ′ti + eit
(D.2)
where ei;t = iei;t + i;t,
DUi;t = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ 0 t ≤ Tbi1 t > tbi ; (D.3)
DT ∗i;t = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ 0 t ≤ Tbi(t − tbi) t > tbi ; (D.4)
where Tbi = iT; i ∈ , denotes the time of the break for the i-th unit in
a closed subset of (0,1), and F ′t :s are the common factors which are used to
account for the possible cross-sectional dependence. The cointegrating vector
is speciﬁed as a function of time:
i;t = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ i;1 t ≤ Tbii;2 t > tbi : (D.5)
Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s test computes a ZetNT () = N−1∑Ni=1 tp^i()
statistic for each break point using the idiosyncratic disturbance terms (eit).
The break point is estimated as the argument that minimizes the sequence
of standardized statistics. Thus, the estimated break date is given by
T^b = argmin
∈
⎛⎝N−1/2ZetNT () −e2()
√
N√
 e2() ⎞⎠ :
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Appendix E
Panel DOLS and panel DSUR
estimators
E.1 Panel DOLS
Mark and Sul (2003) consider a DOLS estimator with ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁxed ef-
fects and heterogenous trends, and with ﬁxed eﬀects, heterogenous trends,
and common time eﬀects. The last model accounts for cross-sectional depen-
dence by introducing a common time eﬀect. Mark and Sul’s model assumes
that observations on each individual i obey the following triangular repre-
sentation:
yit = i + it + t + ′xit + uit; (E.1)
where (1;−′) is a cointegrating vector between yit and xit, which is identical
across individuals, i is a individual-speciﬁc eﬀect, it is a individual-speciﬁc
linear trend, t is a common time-speciﬁc factor, and uit is a idionsyncratic
error that is independent across i, but possibly dependent across t. Model
(E.1) allows for a limited form of cross-sectional correlation, where the equi-
librium error for each individual is driven in part by t.
Panel DOLS eliminates the possible endogeneity between explanatory
variables and the dependent variable by assuming that uit is correlated at
most with pi leads and lags of △xit (Mark and Sul 2003). The possible en-
dogeneity can be controlled by projecting uit onto these pi leads and lags:
uit = pis=−pi′i;s△ xi;t−s + uit∗ = ′izit + u∗it: (E.2)
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The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all leads and lags of △xit and the
estimated equation becomes:
yit = i + it + t + ′xit + izit + u∗it; (E.3)
where ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. The consistent estimation of
(I.4) is based on sequential limits, i.e., as T →∞ then n→∞. Equation (I.4)
can be feasible estimated in panels with small to moderate n.
E.2 Panel DSUR
However, if there remains correlation between equilibrium error, uit, and leads
and lags of other cross-sections △xjt, j /= i, the panel DOLS exhibits the same
form of second order asymptotic bias as pooled OLS (Mark and Sul 2003).
Panel DSUR estimator can be used to account for this correlation.
The data generation process in Mark et al. (2005) DSUR estimator is of
the form
yit = ix′it + uit; (E.4)△xit = eit (E.5)
where there are n cointegrating regression each with T observations, and xit
and eit are k×1 dimensional vectors. Endogeneity is controlled for by includ-
ing leads and lags of (I.2) into the regression, as in panel DOLS estimator
presented above. Panel DSUR estimates a long-run covariance matrix that is
used in estimation of equation (I.1). This makes panel DSUR more eﬃcient
than panel DOLS when cross-sections are dependent. The eﬃciency of panel
DSUR actually improves as the correlation between cross-sections increases.
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Appendix F
Country lists
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Table F.1: Country list I
Country observations country observations
Australia 35 Malaysia 32
Austria 37 Malta 27
Bangladesh 21 Mauritius 32
Barbados 28 Mexico 30
Belgium 30 Netherlands 37
Bolivia 30 New Zealand 34
Canada 37 Nicaragua 21
Chile 37 Norway 36
Colombia 37 Panama 32
Cyprus 37 Papua New Guinea 20
Denmark 36 Philippines 35
Ecuador 37 Portugal 27
Egypt 36 Senegal 24
El Salvador 28 Singapore 37
Fiji 23 Spain 37
Finland 36 Sweden 37
Germany 25 Syrian Arab Republic 36
Greece 37 Taiwan 25
Hong Kong 27 Turkey 36
Hungary 30 UK 32
India 37 USA 37
Indonesia 29 Uruguay 23
Ireland 36 Venezuela 29
Israel 34
Italy 32
Japan 37
Korea, Republic of 37
Kuwait 38
Macao 20
Madagascar 22
N=53
Observations give the maximum number of simultaneous observations in the series of
EHII2.1 inequality measure and real GDP per capita.
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Table F.2: Country list II
Countries (25 years) Countries (34 years) Countries (37 years)
1973-1996 1963-1996 1963-1999
Australia Australia Austria
Austria Austria Canada
Barbados Canada Chile
Bolivia Chile Colombia
Canada Colombia Ecuador
Chile Denmark Finland
Colombia Ecuador Greece
Cyprus Finland India
Denmark Greece Japan
Ecuador India Korea, Republic of
Egypt Ireland Netherlands
Finland Israel Singapore
Greece Japan Spain
Hungary Korea, Republic of Sweden
India Netherlands United States
Indonesia New Zealand
Ireland Norway
Israel Philippines
Italy Singapore
Japan Spain
Korea, Republic of Sweden
Kuwait Syria
Malaysia Turkey
Malta United States
Mauritius
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Syria
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
N=38 N=24 N=15
Years give the number of simultaneous yearly observations in the series of EHII2.1 inequality measure and
real GDP per capita.
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Chapter 4
Income inequality and savings: a
reassessment of the relationship
in cointegrated panels
Abstract1
The eﬀect of income inequality on savings and consumption has remained an
open empirical issue despite several decades of research. Results obtained in
this study indicate that income inequality and private consumption are both
I(1) nonstationary variables that are cointegrated, and inequality has had
a negative eﬀect on private consumption in Central-European and Nordic
countries. Results for Anglo-Saxon countries are inconclusive. These ﬁndings
suggest that previous empirical research may have produced biased results
on the eﬀect of inequality on savings by assuming that inequality would be
a stationary variable.
1An earlier version of this chapter has been published in Helsinki Center of Economic
Research Discussion Papers, No. 337
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4.1 Introduction
The eﬀect of savings on capital accumulation and growth has always been
one of the fundamental research topics in economics. According to Smith
(1776), increased division of labor raises productivity, but savings govern
capital accumulation, which enables production growth. In the 18th century,
only rich people saved. Therefore, economic growth was possible only when
there were enough rich people in the society. However, according to Keynes
(1936), inequality of income would slow down economic growth. Keynes ar-
gued that marginal consumption decreases as the income of an individual
increases, and thus, aggregate consumption depends on changes in aggregate
income. Because demand is the basis of investments, and because inequality
lowers aggregate consumption, inequality of income would diminish economic
growth. In neo-classical growth models, income distribution determines the
level savings and thus the level of capital accumulation (Solow 1956; Kaldor
1957).
In addition to the approach of classical economics, there exist several the-
ories describing the eﬀect of income inequality on savings and consumption.
These include the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman (1957), life-
cycle hypothesis by Ando and Modigliani (1963), which was augmented with
intergenerational transfers by Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981), savings under
liquidity constraints by Deaton (1991), and political-economy models (e.g.
Alesina and Perotti (1994)).
Although theoretical research spans several decades, the eﬀect of income
inequality on savings remains an open empirical question. This is due to the
fact that empirical cross-country studies have produced controversial results
on the eﬀect of income inequality on savings. In one of the most recent panel
econometric studies, Leigh and Posso (2009) estimate the eﬀect of the income
share of the top 1% on the percentage value of gross savings of the GDP
and ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of inequality on national savings.
Similarly, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the percentage value of savings of the GDP using several diﬀerent
measures of income inequality. However, Smith (2001) ﬁnds that inequality,
measured with Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini index, has a statistically
robust positive eﬀect on the percentage value of savings of the GDP. Cook
112
(1995) ﬁnds the same eﬀect in less developed economies. Li and Zou (2004)
ﬁnd that inequality has a negative eﬀect on private savings using Deininger
and Squire’s (1996) Gini index and the ratio of private savings of GDP.
All the empirical studies summarized above have assumed that income
inequality, measured either by the Gini index or by the share of income earned
by diﬀerent income classes, is a stationary variable. However, in the early
theoretical literature on income inequality, the income variation was assumed
to be driven by a stochastic process (Chambernowne 1953; Mandelbrot 1961).
Moreover, Mandelbrot (1961) argued that time-independent, i.e. stationary,
income variations are unlikely, and it is possible that the distribution of
income will never reach a steady state implying a nonstationary process of
income variation. In recent studies with cross-country panel data, Malinen
(2012) and Herzer and Vollmer (2012) have obtained results according to
which the data generating process of income inequality would be driven by a
stochastic trend, indicating that inequality would be an I(1) nonstationary
variable. Previously, for example, Mocan (1999) has obtained similar results.2
If this assumption of the early theoretical models held in general, it would
oﬀer an explanation to the controversy in the previous empirical studies. This
is because regressing a stationary variable on an I(1) variable(s) can lead to
a spurious regression (Stewart 2011). In empirical studies, savings is usually
measured as a percentage of the GDP. If both logarithmic savings and the
logarithmic GDP are I(1) variables and cointegrated, their diﬀerence results,
by construction, in a stationary variable, namely savings as a percentage of
the GDP. Thus, if inequality were an I(1) variable and savings as a ratio of
the GDP a stationary I(0) variable, regressing savings on inequality would
give spurious results.
This study uses panel cointegration methods to test the time series prop-
erties of the included variables and to estimate the (possible) long-run rela-
tion between income inequality and savings. We use data on nine developed
economies, and spanning four decades starting from the year 1960. The in-
come share of the top 1%, used to proxy the distribution of income, has been
found to track broader measures of income inequality, like the Gini index,
very well (Leigh 2007). According to panel unit root tests, the logarithmic in-
2See also Jäntti and Jenkins (2010).
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come share of the top 1%, logarithmic gross national savings and logarithmic
private consumption are all I(1) nonstationary variables. Income share of
the top 1% is also found to be cointegrated with private consumption, which
implies that there is a long-run dependency relation between them. The eﬀect
of inequality on private consumption is found to be negative in the Nordic
and Central-European countries, but for the Anglo-Saxon countries the di-
rection of the eﬀect (positive vs. negative) remains somewhat ambiguous.
The results of the panel cointegration tests are inconclusive on possible coin-
tegration between gross savings and the top 1% income share. The real GDP
per capita and gross savings as well as the real GDP per capita and private
consumption are also found to be cointegrated. This implies that the ratios
of savings and private consumption to GDP would be stationary variables
and hence previous research is likely to have produced biased results on the
eﬀect of inequality on savings and consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the theoret-
ical and empirical background of the study. Section 3 describes the data and
presents the results of unit root tests. Section 4 reports the results of cointe-
gration tests and section 5 gives the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical and empirical considerations
Several theories have been constructed to explain the eﬀect of inequality on
savings. In classical economic theory, the form of the individual saving func-
tion determines the eﬀect of income inequality on savings. When the saving
function is linear or concave, the distribution of income and wealth converge
toward equality as the economy grows (Stiglitz 1969). If the saving function
is convex, the marginal propensity to save increases with income. Accord-
ing to the permanent income hypothesis, individuals with low income have
higher propensity to consume, and small changes in income, or its distribu-
tion, do not aﬀect the consumption decisions of households (Friedman 1957).
The life-cycle hypothesis argues that, if bequests are luxury, the saving rate
should be higher among wealthier individuals (Kotlikoﬀ and Summers 1981).
In political-economy models, more unequal income distribution may create
demand for more redistribution through taxation and income transfers, and
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if the saving function of individuals in the economy is convex, i.e. the rich
save more, this will diminish aggregate savings through diminished incomes
of the rich (Alesina and Perotti 1994).
What is common to all of the theories introduced above is that they gen-
erally assume that the individual income process is non-stochastic. However,
as pointed out by Stiglitz (1969), the very ﬁrst (formal) models of income
inequality by Chambernowne (1953) and Mandelbrot (1961) were based on
stochastic processes. Chambernowne (1953) developed a model assuming that
the evolution of income of an individual is determined by his/her income in
the previous year and by a stochastic (chance) process. In modern terms, this
process would be said to be I(1) non-stationary.
I(1) non-stationary processes have a inﬁnite memory, i.e., they are highly
persistent. Assuming some degree of persistence in the evolution of the in-
come series of an individual is quite intuitive as shocks (e.g., wage raise) to
the income process of an individual are likely to have permanent eﬀects on
the future incomes of the individual. Microeconomic literature on household
income and consumption behavior adopted the idea of permanent eﬀects af-
fecting the income series of an individual. For instance, Hall and Mishkin
(1982) considered a stochastic model of consumption proposed by Muth
(1960), where the eﬀect of individual income on consumption was divided
into permanent and transitory components. In a recent study on the evo-
lution of consumption and income inequality, Blundell et al. (2008) use the
same kind of formulation where the income of households varies according to
the following function:
logYit = Zit#t + Pit + vit; (4.1)
where Zit is a set of income characteristics of household i that are observable
and known by consumers at time t,3 vit follows an MA(q) process, and Pi;t =
Pi;t−1 + it with it serially uncorrelated, indicating that the process {P} is
I(1) non-stationary. Several studies in the micro literature tend to ﬁnd that
also empirically the permanent component Pit is a random walk, and hence
it can be modeled as an I(1) nonstationary process (Meghir and Pistaferri
2004; Hall and Mishkin 1982; Blundell et al. 2008).
3These include demographic, education, employment status, ethnic, etc. factors (Blun-
dell et al. 2008)
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Deaton (1991) studied how liquidity constraints aﬀect national savings,
when incomes are driven by a random walk with drift.4 He argued that the as-
sumption of optimal intertemporal consumption behavior of consumers being
restricted by borrowing constraints would help to create a model that could
explain the observed patterns of household wealth and the dependency of
consumption on income during the life cycle of an individual. According to
Deaton, the problem with stochastic life cycle - permanent income models,
like the model by Hall and Mishkin (1982), is that they assume substantial
wealth accumulation at some point of the life cycle of an individual, which
was not supported by the data. Deaton assumed that the labor income of an
individual follows an AR(1) process of the form:
log(yt+1) = log(yt) + log(zt+1) + ; (4.2)
where yt is labor income, zt+1 is stochastic random variable, and  > 0 is a con-
stant. When zt+1 is assumed to be identically and independently distributed,
the labor income process, log(yt), is I(1) non-stationary and, speciﬁcally,
it follows a random walk with drift. Deaton found that, when income is a
random walk and borrowing constraints are binding, it is undesirable for
households to undertake any smoothing of consumption, i.e., they have no
incentives to save. This implies that consumption equals income on all in-
come levels. However, he assumed that the interest rate is higher than the
consumer’s discount rate. If the interest rate equals the consumer’s discount
rate, the stochastic income process and borrowing constraints lead to the re-
sult that the propensity to consume is lower at higher income levels (Seater
1997; Travaglini 2008). In this day and age, the debate on the validity of
the life cycle - permanent income hypothesis is still very much ongoing. In a
recent paper, Attanasio and Weber (2010) review the literature on intertem-
poral allocation models and present some modiﬁcations to the standard life
cycle hypothesis framework to make the model ﬁt the micro data better.
When individual income series are aﬀected by a random walk component,
the aggregated time series is likely to be characterized by a random walk
(Rossanan and Seater 1995). This applies to the aggregate income, but the
4Assuming a drift in income relation is intuitive and necessary, because income tends
to grow over time. Thus, just variations around that trend are assumed to be stochastic.
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distribution of income is often measured using some bounded measure, like
the Gini index or share of total income. This changes things a bit as any
measure that varies within some boundaries like the income share, cannot,
by deﬁnition, be an I(1) nonstationary process. This is because the variance
of such an series cannot grow to inﬁnity with time, which is what happens
with random walk series. However, it is possible that the distribution can
have a stochastic trend in its other moments, like the mean, skewness, and
kurtosis, than variance (White and Granger 2010). Thus, when individual
income series that are aﬀected by a random walk component are aggregated
to a bounded distribution, it is likely that this distribution has a stochastic
trend in its kurtosis and/or in its skewness. This way the measure of income
inequality, being a functional of some income distribution, may exhibit such
high levels of persistence that it is better approximated by an I(1) process
than a stationary process.
Figure 1 presents the detrended and demeaned time series of the top 1%
income share series for 5 developed countries. Time series of the shares seem
to "wander" randomly through time in all countries, which is a distinctive
feature of a series that is driven by a stochastic trend. The series are also
clearly not mean- or trend-reverting in the observed period, which is one
condition of stationarity.
Thus, the possibility that income inequality is driven by a stochastic trend
needs to be taken into account in the analysis of the relationship between
inequality and savings. Especially in empirical analysis, this is quite crucial,
as the possible I(1) non-stationarity of the included variables determines the
way this relationship can be consistently estimated (see the Introduction).
That is why we next turn to testing the time series properties of relevant
variables.
4.3 Data and unit root tests
4.3.1 Data
In this study we use the the top 1% income share of population to proxy the
income distribution in diﬀerent countries. Since the work of Piketty (2003),
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Figure 1. The detrended and demeaned shares of income of the top 1% of population in 5
developed countries 1925-1998 Source: Leigh (2007)
there has been a growing interest towards building long time series of the
evolution of top income shares of the population. Measuring the developments
in top income shares makes it possible to construct substantially longer time
series from the evolution of the distribution of income than would be possible
using the Gini index or similar aggregate measures. Top income series are
built using national tax data and applying the same method across countries
to make the series comparable (Atkinson and Piketty 2007). Leigh (2007) has
also demonstrated that the top 1% income share series have a high correlation
with other measures of income inequality, like the Gini index. The dataset
on the top 1% income shares gathered by Leigh is a primary source of data
in this study.
However, after Leigh (2007) there have been additions to the pool of coun-
tries for which a historical dataset of the evolution of top incomes is available.
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Roine and Waldenström (2011) have used data collected from several diﬀer-
ent sources in their analysis of common trends and shocks in top income
series. Their dataset is extensive, but it, like the dataset by Leigh (2007), has
one caveat. Due to the length of some series (starting from the beginning of
the 20 century) the observations from all countries are not continuous, and
thus they are forced to extrapolate over some observations. This is problem-
atic, because extrapolation of over just one observation may alter the time
series properties of the observed variable. From the dataset of Leigh we know
that the series of New Zealand has observations missing in 1961, 1974, and
1976. Thus, New Zealand is not included in the datasets that consists of those
periods. For the other countries neither Leigh nor Roine and Waldenström
explicitly list the observations over which they are extrapolating, and thus
we have to check the original data sources to ﬁnd out about the location of
the missing observations. After observing the individual sources of data, we
include nine countries in our baseline dataset. These countries are: Australia,
Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.5 All these countries have continuous
observations from the year 1960 onwards, except Switzerland from which we
have only bi-annual average observations (Dell et al. 2010). That is, for ex-
ample, in 1995 and in 1996 the value corresponds to the average share of the
top 1% income during 1995-1996. Thus, we do not include Switzerland on any
of the unit root tests, but observations from Switzerland are included in the
cointegration testing and estimations. Because of the restrictions imposed by
some of our testing methods explained later, the nine countries are divided
into three groups of countries according to their (assumed) economic models.
The groups are: Nordic, Central-European, and Anglo-Saxon countries.6 In
5The problematic countries in this dataset are Finland and the Netherlands. In Fin-
land’s case the original data, allegedly spanning from 1920 to 2005, could not be checked,
but we could check that the data is continuous at least from 1966 onwards. For the Nether-
lands there are direct observations only from the year 1977 onward and signiﬁcant part
of the previous observations are a result of interpolation and pure estimation. However,
panel unit root tests are done also without Nordic countries and the Netherlands, and
because extrapolation would have the biggest impact on those tests, the bias created by
possible extrapolation over some values of top 1% series in Finland and the Netherlands
is diminished.
6Canada, United Kingdom and Unites States are included in the Anglo-Saxon group.
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addition, Japan and New Zealand are included in the testing for the time
series properties of the top 1% income share data.
The endogenous variables used in this study are the gross savings and
the private consumption expenditures. The data on these is obtained from
the AMECO database compiled and published by the Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Aﬀairs of the European Comission. AMECO is
used, because it has more extensive time series coverage on the variables
in question than, for example, the dataset of World Bank. AMECO does
not include data on private savings, but because private consumption is the
mirror image of private savings, it should not make any diﬀerence which
of these two variables is used. Both variables are measured in aggregate
terms to minimize the eﬀects that a third variable might have on the relation
between inequality and savings. Changes, for example, in fertility may have
an eﬀect on variables that are measured in per capita terms without aﬀecting
the income share of the top 1%. Thus, expressing gross savings and private
consumption in per capita terms could add stochastic elements to the time
series of those variables unrelated to their relation with income inequality.
The other variables included in the estimation are the real gross domestic
product per capita, the dependency rate, and the interest rate. The real GDP
per capita is historically thought to proxy the expected lifetime wealth of the
residents in a country (Cook 1995). The level of national income may also
have a direct eﬀect on gross savings and consumption. The dependency rate
is used to control for possible changes in the saving patterns across the life
cycle of individuals, and it measures the ratio of the population under 15 to
that over 64 years of age. Interest rates may aﬀect the individual propensity
to save by aﬀecting the proﬁtability of saving. The year 1960 is the ﬁrst year
included in the dataset but the last year varies from one country to another.
The data on dependency is obtained from the World Development Indicators
of the World Bank and the data on interest rates is from the database of the
International Monetary Fund.
The data on interest rates varies a little across countries in the dataset.
The baseline rate is the discount or the bank rate, i.e. the rate at which cen-
France, Netherlands, and Switzerland are included in the Central-European group, and
Finland, Norway, and Sweden are included in the group of Nordic countries.
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tral banks lend to deposit banks. However, for some countries, observations
of this variable are not available for the whole time period. That is why there
are some diﬀerences in the indicators of interest rates between the groups of
countries. For Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland, the central bank
rate is used. For Canada, the United Kingdom, and the USA, the treasury
bill rate is used, which gives the rate at which short-term securities are issued
or traded in the market. For France and the Netherlands, the money market
rate is used, which gives the rate on short term lending between ﬁnancial
institutions. Although using diﬀerent indicators of interest rates is not opti-
mal, all these indicators should reﬂect changes in the interest rate at which
consumers borrow from and deposit money to banks.
4.3.2 Unit root tests
To test for possible unit roots, four diﬀerent panel unit root tests are used.
The ﬁrst two are the so called traditional and the last two the so called
second generation panel unit root tests. Traditional panel unit root tests do
not allow for cross-sectional dependency while the second generation tests
allow for cross-sectional correlation.
The traditional panel unit root tests, by Im et al. (2003) and the panel
version of the ADF test by Maddala and Wu (1999), are based on the fol-
lowing regression:
△yit = iyi;t−1 + it + t + t + it; (4.3)
where i are individual constants, it are individual time trends, and t are
the common time eﬀects. The tests rely on the assumption that E[itjs] = 0∀ t; s and i ≠ j, which is required for calculating common time eﬀects. Thus,
if the diﬀerent series are correlated, the last assumption is violated.
The second generation tests by Pesaran (2007) and Phillips and Sul
(2003) are based on the regression
△yit = yi;t−1 + it + i + it + it; (4.4)
where is are the individual constants, it are the individual time trends,
and t is the common time eﬀect, whose coeﬃcients, i, are assumed to be
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non-stochastic, measure the impact of the common time eﬀects of series i,
and it is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and covariance
of 2 and independent of js and s for all i ≠ j and s; t. Cross-sectional
dependence is allowed through the common time eﬀect, which generates the
correlation between cross-sectional units. The matrix i gives the non-random
factor loading coeﬃcients that determine the extent of the cross-sectional
correlation. The null hypothesis in all tests is that i = 0 ∀ i. The alternative
hypotheses are:
H1 ∶ i < 0; i = 1;2; :::;N1; i = 0; i = N1 + 1;N1 + 2; :::;N: (4.5)
For consistency of panel unit root tests it is also required that, under the
alternative, the fraction of the individual processes that are stationary is
non-zero, formally limN→∞(N1/N) = , 0 <  ≤ 1 (Im et al. 2003).
Table 4.1 presents the results of the four panel unit root tests for the top
1% income share. The tests have been applied to three diﬀerent datasets.
The ﬁrst includes the data on ﬁve countries with the longest continuous time
series in the dataset by Leigh (2007).7 The second dataset includes the eight
countries on which we have data for all the included variables excluding
Switzerland. The third dataset includes observations from seven countries
excluding the Nordic countries. This dataset spans from 1983 to 2002.8 The
third dataset is used, because, according to Roine and Waldenström (2011),
there is a trend break in the series of the top 1% income share in 1991 in
the Nordic countries. According to Roine and Waldenström (2011), there
are similar trend breaks in the top 1% income share series in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, including Australia, Canada, UK and USA (in 1982), in
Central European countries, including France, Switzerland, and Netherlands
(in 1976), and in Asian countries, including Japan (in 1983). So, to make
sure that the results of the panel unit root tests are not driven by structural
breaks, the tests are run using only those countries that should not have
breaks in their top 1% income share series in the test period. According
to all tests in all datasets, the logarithmic top 1% income share is a I(1)
7Countries included in the test are: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and the USA.
All these countries should have continuous observations throughout the period.
8Countries included in the test are: Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the USA.
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Table 4.1: Panel unit root tests of the top 1% income share
variable period IPS ADF Pesaran PS
top 1% 1925-1998 3.449 2.270 -0.103 4.200
(0.998) (0.994) (0.459) (0.838)
top 1% 1960-1996 5.256 1.282 -0.348 3.212
(0.999) (0.998) (0.364) (0.976)
top 1% 1983-2002 -0.302 16.670 -0.198 16.636
(0.381) (0.273) (0.421) (0.187)
The tested equation is:△yit = iyi;t−1+i+it+t+it. All variables are tested in logarithms.
P-values of the test statistics appear in parentheses. With the exception of the PS test,
lag length was determined using Schwarts information criterion (SIC). In PS test the lag
length is selected with top-down method. The dataset of 1925-1998 includes 6 countries
and 444 observations, the dataset of 1960-1996 includes 9 countries and 333 observations,
and the dataset of 1983-2002 includes 6 countries and 121 observations.
nonstationary process. This holds even in the last test, where the Nordic
countries are excluded from the test to control for the possible structural
breaks present in their top 1% income share series.
Table 4.2 presents the results of panel unit root tests of the other variables.
Because gross savings is expressed in constant Euros and private consumption
in purchasing power parities (ppp), two diﬀerent series of real GDP per capita
series are included in the dataset. According to all tests, gross savings, private
consumption, the interest rates, and both versions of the real GDP per capita
are I(1) processes. With the exception of the test by Pesaran (2007), all tests
clearly reject the null hypothesis of the nonstationarity of the dependency
rate, indicating that it is a trend-stationary variable.
4.4 Cointegration tests
4.4.1 Testing with the whole data
The methods for testing for cointegration in panel data have developed very
rapidly during the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century. One of the most com-
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Table 4.2: Panel unit root tests of the other included variables, 1960-1996
variable IPS ADF Pesaran PS
gross savings 2.207 2.144 -0.186 4.79
(0.986) (0.999) (0.426) (1.000)
private consumption 12.532 0.0645 0.221 7.53
(1.000) (1.000) (0.587) (0.960)
GDP, ppp 11.006 14.039 0.347 5.331
(1.000) (1.000) (0.636) (0.994)
GDP, eur 3.912 19.453 2.420 11.210
(1.000) (0.364) (0.992) (0.796)
dependency -5.077 82.382 1.005 50.92
(<.001) (<.001) (0.843) (<.001)
interest rate 0.717 13.937 -1.144 19.97
(0.764) (0.731) (0.126) (0.220)
The tested equation is: △yit = iyi;t−1 + i + it + t + it. All variables are in logarithms.
Probabilities of the test statistics appear in parentheses. In all other tests, except in the
PS test, lag lengths were determined using Schwarts information criterion (SIC). Testing
includes 9 countries and 333 observations.
monly used cointegration testing methods has been the residual based panel
cointegration test by Pedroni (2004). The limitation of Pedroni’s test is that
it assumes independence of cross-sections, an assumption, which is likely to
be violated in econometric cross-country studies.9 Cross-sectional correlation
may bias the results towards rejecting the null of no cointegration (Baner-
jee et al. 2004). To account for this bias, we use a panel cointegration test
developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) that controls for cross-
sectional dependency by introducing common factors. The test also controls
for possible endogeneity of regressors by including leads and lags of diﬀer-
enced explanatory variables in estimation (this method is explained more
thoroughly in the appendix I describing the panel DSUR estimator). A more
thorough explanation of the test by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006)
9There are, for example, only few countries that avoided the downturn of 2008 that
started from the U.S.
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can also be found in the appendix G. The test is based on two diﬀerent test
statistics, namely Z^NT (^) and Zt^NT (^) to test for the possible cointegra-
tion between two variables. Both statistics are based on the ADF regression,
from where the former uses the estimated coeﬃcients of ^ and the latter the
associated t-ratio to compute the test statistic.
Table 4.3 presents the results of the panel cointegration test by Banerjee
and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006). It reports the results of the cointegration tests
between gross savings and the top 1% income share and gross savings and the
GDP per capita.10 In addition, we test for cointegration between private con-
sumption and the top 1% income share and private consumption and GDP
per capita. 11 According to the results of the Zt^NT (^) test presented in table
4.3, gross savings and the income share of top 1% as well as private consump-
tion and top 1% income share are cointegrated at the 5% level. According
to the Z^NT (^) test, only gross savings and the top 1% income share are
cointegrated. However, Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) note that the
Zt^NT (^) statistic should be preferred over the Z^NT (^) statistic, because the
former has considerably better size and power properties especially in small
samples. Thus, we rely more on the results of the Zt^NT (^), and conclude that
both gross savings and private consumption seem to be cointegrated with the
top 1% income share. The GDP per capita and gross savings as well as GDP
per capita and private consumption seem to be cointegrated of order 1.
Table 4.3 only presents the results of the test without breaks. However,
we also conducted tests with breaks, but if trend breaks are allowed for,
the results do not change dramatically. This is expected as structural breaks
tend to bias the results towards the acceptance of the null (Banerjee and
Carrion-i-Silvestre 2006). The results of the tests including structural breaks
are available upon request.
10GDP per capita in euros is used in the for gross savings as the gross savings series is
also presented in euros. GDP per capita in ppp is used in the test for private savings for
the same reason.
11Estimation is done with Gauss. We are grateful to Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing
the program code.
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Table 4.3: Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s cointegration test for gross sav-
ings, ﬁnal consumption and the income share of top 1%
gross savings private consumption
Top 1% income share
Zt^NT (^) -3.952 -2.255
(<.0001) (0.0121)
Z^NT (^) -3.084 -0.548
(0.0010) (0.292)
GDP per capita
Zt^NT (^) -5.683 -5.494
(<.0001) (<.0001)
Z^NT (^) -3.090 -6.399
(0.0010) (<.0001)
countries 9 9
years 1960-1996 1960-1996
observations 333 333
The tested model includes individual deterministic constants and trends.
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4.4.2 Testing for the cointegration rank
One of the obvious drawbacks of the residual tests, like the ones presented
above, is that they cannot identify the number of cointegrating vectors be-
tween the variables. If we have just two variables, this is not a problem,
because then there cannot be more than one cointegrating vector. However,
with three variables, there can be two cointegrating vectors, with four vari-
ables three cointegrating vectors, etc. The cointegration rank aﬀects estima-
tors, because some estimators, like the panel DSUR estimator, are based on
the single equation approach meaning that a single cointegration relation-
ship is assumed. If there are two or more cointegration relationships between
the variables, the asymptotic properties of the estimators derived under the
assumption of one cointegration relation are no longer valid. In addition,
estimators allowing for multiple cointegrating vectors, like the estimator by
Breitung (2005) used in this study, usually assume that the cointegration
rank is homogenous across the countries included in the panel.
To allow for multiple cointegrating vectors, we use the panel trace coin-
tegration test developed by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) to test for the coin-
tegration rank in models involving several explanatory variables. Their test
is based on the likelihood ratio test of Johansen (1995). The general model
on which Larsson ja Lyhagen’s test is based can be written as
△Yt =  +Yt−1 +m−1k=1  kYt−k + t; (4.6)
where  = ik′kj,  and  k are of order Np×Np and  = (′1; ′2; :::; ′n) and
t = (′1t; ′2t; :::; ′nt) are of order Np× 1, and t = (′1t; ′2t; :::; ′nt) is assumed to
be multivariate normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix

.
It is assumed that matrix has a reduced rank ofNr, 0 ≤ r ≤ p, and can be
decomposed as  = ik′kj. The matrix ik is assumed to be unrestricted, but
kj = 0 ∀i ≠ j. The fact that unrestricted ik means that diﬀerent panel units
can be dependent, but because of the restriction on kj, these dependency
relations can only appear in the short run. In other words, cointegrating
relations are only allowed within the units of the panel. The cointegration
rank is estimated by sequentially testing
H(r) ∶ rank() ≤ Nr (4.7)
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against the alternative
H(p) ∶ rank() ≤ Np (4.8)
as in Johansen (1995). A more detailed explanation of the test is provided in
Appendix B.
A limitation in the panel cointegration test by Larsson and Lyhagen
(2007) is that the number of estimated parameters increases rapidly with
the number of cross sections. This means that there need to be enough time
series observations compared to cross-sectional units or the parameters of the
model cannot be estimated. In our baseline dataset, there are nine countries
and 37 time series observations per country, a relation which is far too small
for the test. That is why countries are divided into three groups as explained
in the section 3.1. Because countries in these groups tend to have similar eco-
nomic and social structures, it is more likely that they also have homogenous
cointegration relations.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the results of the test for the cointegration
rank by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) for the three groups of countries for
gross savings and private consumption as the dependent variable.12 All vari-
ables are detrended and demeaned before testing. The VAR lag length was
determined using the Schwartz information criterion (SIC).
According to the results presented in table 4.4, the top 1% income share
and gross savings appear to be diﬀerence stationary variables in the Central
European and Anglo-Saxon countries. That is, both are I(1) variables that
are not cointegrated. This result contradicts the results presented in Table
4.3, where gross savings and the top 1% income share were found to be
cointegrated. The results of Nordic countries indicate that there would be,
at least, two cointegration vectors between top 1% income share and gross
savings. When the GDP per capita and the interest rate are added test ﬁnds
a cointegration rank of two in the Nordic countries.
According to results of table 4.5, private consumption and the top 1%
income share are cointegrated in the Central European and Anglo-Saxon
countries. When the GDP per capita and the interest rate are added, the
test ﬁnds a cointegration rank of two in the Anglo-Saxon countries and coin-
12All testing is done by Gauss. We are grateful to Johan Lyhagen for providing the
Gauss code on his homepage.
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Table 4.4: Panel trace cointegration test for savings and the top 1% income
share for the 3 country groups
Nordic Central-Europe* Anglo-Saxon**
top 1%
r=0 211.12 292.15 72.32
(197.64) (307.22) (92.86)
r≤ 1 57.52 - -
(50.71)
top 1%, GDP & interest
r=0 469.50 - -
(381.22)
r≤1 301.53 - -
(283.40)
r≤2 186.47 - -
(175.66)
r≤3 113.70 - -
(83.32)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
All series are detrended and demeaned before testing. * In the group of Central European
countries, only GDP per capita and top 1% income share were included in the test, because
there were too few time series observations per country to include a 4 variable. ** for Anglo-
Saxon countries, GDP per capita in constant Euros was used instead of GDP per capita
in purchasing power parities in the test with private consumption. All variables are tested
in logarithms. Bartlett corrected critical values are presented in parentheses. Lag lengths
were selected using Schwarz information criterion.
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Table 4.5: Panel trace cointegration test for consumption and the top 1%
income share for the 3 country groups
Nordic Central-Europe* Anglo-Saxon**
top 1%
r=0 295.33 294.36 194.75
(167.08) (270.17) (171.47)
r≤1 68.33 72.97 38.86
(51.49) (83.63) (59.64)
top 1%, GDP & interest
r=0 410.85 516.43 1137.26
(381.27) (470.88) (992.44)
r≤1 281.61 194.42 586.90
(267.77) (214.56) (523.78)
r≤2 172.84 - 300.25
(166.60) (336.24)
r≤3 58.99 - -
(89.81)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
All series are detrended and demeaned before testing. * In the group of Central European
countries, only GDP per capita and top 1% income share were included in the test, because
there were too few time series observations per country to include a 4 variable. ** for Anglo-
Saxon countries, GDP per capita in constant Euros was used instead of GDP per capita
in purchasing power parities in the test with private consumption. All variables are tested
in logarithms. Bartlett corrected critical values are presented in parentheses. Lag lengths
were selected using Schwarz information criterion.
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tegration rank of three in the Nordic countries. In the Central European
countries only private consumption, the top 1% income share and the GDP
per capita were included in the testing, because there were not enough time
series observations for including four variables. In Central-European coun-
tries the cointegration rank among these three variables is found to be one.
The results of Nordic countries presented above thus indicate that there
are two stationary cointegration relations between gross savings and the top
1% income share as well as between private consumption and the top 1%
income share. In the time series case this would imply that, in both of these
tests, the two variables are I(0) trend-stationary. However, it does not seem
likely that some of these series would be trend-stationary in Nordic countries,
as all of the panel unit root tests found gross savings, private consumption
and the top 1% income share to be I(1) non-stationary (see section 3.2). If
the time series of a variable in three out of nine countries would be trend-
stationary, it would be highly unlikely for the tests to present the series as
I(1) non-stationary.
With panel data, the implications of the cointegration rank test are not
so straightforward as they are in the case of time series. In model (4.7), the
block matrix elements of  are given by ij = Nk=1ik′jk, which equal ij′j
when ij = 0 for all i ≠ j. However, if ij ≠ 0 for i ≠ j, then the block matrix
elements of  are given ij′jk and the rank of  can be larger than the
number of variables. That is, because the dimension of  is Np × Np, the
number of cross-sectional cointegration relations may increase the rank of the
matrix. One likely source of cross-sectional cointegration would be a station-
ary linear combination of I(1) non-stationary common factor(s) driving the
GDP per capita series in the Nordic countries. As Nordic countries have very
similar social structures, and because they are small countries within close
proximity to each other, it would be quite natural if a common stochastic
trend would aﬀect their GDP series. As GDP per capita and consumption
were found to be cointegrated, common stochastic trend driving the GDP
series would also aﬀect on the series of savings and private consumption.
So, the results of the Nordic countries presented in table 4.5 are likely to
be explained by cross-sectional cointegration relations aﬀecting the GDP per
capita and consumption series.
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In conclusion, results of cointegration tests indicate that income inequal-
ity, measured with the top 1% income share, and private consumption are
cointegrated, but the results of the cointegration tests for gross savings are
somewhat inconclusive. It is not quite clear why this is or why the results
deviate from the results of the unit root tests. It should be noted, however,
that in the case of the test of Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) we had
more than double the number of observations compared to the test of Lars-
son and Lyhagen (2007). So, even with the Bartlett correction, it is possible
that the power of Larsson and Lyhagen’s test was not suﬃcient to reject the
null hypothesis of zero rank of the  matrix.
4.5 Estimation
According to the results presented in the previous section, the cointegration
rank among the included variables varies between the groups of countries.
Because of this, two diﬀerent estimation methods are applied to estimate the
long-run eﬀect of the income share of the top 1% on the gross savings and
private consumption. Panel dynamic seemingly unrelated regressors (DSUR)
estimator of Mark et al. (2005) is used when there seems to be only one cointe-
grating vector between the variables, while the two-step maximum-likelihood
panel VAR estimator by Breitung (2005) is used when there seem to be two
or more cointegrating relations between the variables. The reason for using
panel DSUR estimator is that Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) have found
that single-equation estimators, like panel DSUR, perform better than the
VAR estimator of Breitung (2005), when cross-sections are cross-sectionally
correlated and/or cointegrated.13 Both estimators control for possible endo-
geneity of the regressors. The panel DSUR estimator controls for endogeneity
by including lags and leads of ﬁrst diﬀerences of the explanatory variables
in the estimated equation. Panel VAR controls for endogeneity by imposing
13Results of Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) imply that panel DOLS would perform better
than panel VAR by Breitung (2005) in cross-sectionally cointegrated panels. Panel DSUR
was not included in testing. However, as panel DSUR is more eﬃcient than panel DOLS
when cross-sections are correlated, it is also likely to be more eﬃcient than panel DOLS
when cross-sections are cointegrated.
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block-diagonality of the Fisher information matrix with respect to short- and
long-run parameters. A more detailed explanation of the estimators used can
be found in the Appendix. The possible long-run cross-unit dependency rela-
tions in income and consumption series between the Nordic countries found
in previous section cannot be controlled with estimators allowing for short-
run dependencies and/or cross-sectional correlation. Fortunately, Wagner and
Hlouskova (2010) have found that, if there is only a cross-sectionally iden-
tical unit-speciﬁc cointegrating relationship(s) between the cross-sections, it
creates only a small bias in the results of cointegration estimators used here.
The estimated model is:
log(Yit) = i + ′1log(GDPit) + ′2log(top1it)++′3(interestit) + it + uit; (4.9)
where where i’s are individual constant, it’s are individual trends, and
uit is a white noise error vector with E(uit) = 0. Table 4.6 presents the
results of estimation of equation (4.9) using the panel DSUR and panel VAR
estimators.14 According to the results, the relation between the top 1%
income share and gross savings somewhat depends on the included variables.
The initial estimate of the cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality measured
with the top 1% income share is negative,15 but the panel VAR estimate
from the model including also the GDP per capita and the interest rate is
positive in all country groups. However, the parameter estimate of the top
1% income share is statistically signiﬁcant only in Nordic countries and on
the last estimation of the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Theories describing the relation between income inequality and savings
usually concentrate on household savings behavior, which makes private sav-
ings or consumption a more valid measure to assess the eﬀect of inequality
on consumption or savings than gross savings that includes also the govern-
ment. Table 4.7 presents the results of panel DSUR and panel VAR esti-
mations where the dependent variable is private consumption.16 According
14Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul and Joerg
Breitung for providing the program codes on their homepages.
15If ﬁrst equation is estimated with panel VAR, results are similar to those presented in
table 4.6.
16Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul and Joerg
Breitung for providing the program codes on their homepages.
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Table 4.6: Estimates of the long-run elasticity of gross savings with respect
to top 1% income share in 3 groups of countries
Dependent variable: log(gross savings)
Nordics Central-Europe Anglo-Saxon
Panel DSUR (l&l =2)
log(top 1%) -0.0846** -0.127*** -0.4462
(0.0288) (0.0405) (0.3706)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;1)
log(top 1%) 0.0799*** 0.3794 0.2499
(0.0251) (0.2751) (0.1769)
log(GDP) 0.0118*** 0.0946*** 0.0903***
(0.0015) (0.0100) (0.0108)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;2)
log(top 1%) 0.5654* 0.1866 0.5385*
(0.2512) (0.2583) (0.1990)
log(GDP) 0.1374*** 0.0894*** 0.0983***
(0.0169) (0.0097) (0.0105)
log(interest) -0.3655** -0.0213 0.0990
(0.1237) (0.0477) (0.0803)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are
presented in parentheses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s
Pre-whitening method. Inclusion of individual constants means that all estimations are
made with ﬁxed eﬀects. Lags gives the lag order of the VAR model. L&l =2 means that
ﬁrst and second leads and lags of ﬁrst diﬀerences of the explanatory variables are used as
instruments.
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Table 4.7: Estimates of the long-run elasticity of private consumption with
respect to top 1% income share in 3 groups of countries
Dependent variable: log(private consumption)
Nordic Central-Europe Anglo-Saxon
Panel DSUR (l&l=2)
log(top 1%) -0.1107*** -0.1219*** -0.1260***
(0.0097) (0.0342) (0.0325)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;2)
log(top 1%) -0.1409** -0.2101*** 0.1130***
(0.0490) (0.0530) (0.0290)
log(GDP) 0.0905*** 0.1002*** 0.0982***
(0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0021)
Panel VAR (lags=1;1;2)
log(top 1%) -0.1349* -0.1748*** 0.0826***
(0.0512) (0.0451) (0.0262)
log(GDP) 0.0919*** 0.0996*** 0.1007***
(0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0021)
log(interest) -0.0132 0.0203 -0.0383***
(0.0262) (0.0120) (0.0108)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are
presented in parentheses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s
Pre-whitening method. Lags gives the lag order of the VAR model. Individual constants
and trends are included in the regressions. L&l =2 means that ﬁrst and second lags and
leads of ﬁrst diﬀerences of explanatory variables are used as instruments.
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to the results, the cointegrating coeﬃcient of the GDP per capita has the
expected positive sign in all groups of countries, but the interest rate has a
statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect only in the group of the Anglo-Saxon
countries. The "blurry" estimate of interest rates in Central-European coun-
tries is not a surprise as these countries had diﬀering indicators of interest
rates. Among the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, individual countries
had the same indicator of interest rate within each group, but the indicators
diﬀered between the groups. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the treasury bill
rate was used, whereas in the Nordic countries, the central bank rate was
used. Although it is surprising that the interest rate has no statistically sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on the level of private consumption in the Nordic countries,
the result may also be explained by diﬀerent consumption proﬁles. Bacchetta
and Gerlach (1997) found that in the United States and Canada, the changes
in credit conditions had a larger impact on consumption than in France or
the UK. Humphrey (2004) also shows that credit cards are used more of-
ten as a means of payment in Canada and the US than in Europe. Thus,
it is likely that changes in the interest rates have a greater eﬀect on private
consumption in the Anglo-Saxon than in the European countries.
According to the results of Table 4.7, the cointegrating coeﬃcient of in-
equality is negative in all three country groups when the top 1% income share
is the only explanatory variable. However, when the GDP per capita is added
as an explanatory variable, the cointegrating coeﬃcient of inequality changes
to positive in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the Nordic and Central-European
countries the coeﬃcient remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant, thus
indicating that these results are robust.
As such, the results imply that the long-run elasticity of private consump-
tion with respect to inequality would be negative in the Nordic and Central-
European countries, but positive in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Although this
result is somewhat counterintuitive, it is, of course, always possible that the
individual saving function is convex in the European countries and concave
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, this contradicts the results of most
theories and also some quite recent micro-econometric evidence from the US
stating that propensity to save raises with income (Dynan et al. 2004). From
these reasons some reservations need to be attached to the estimation results
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of the Anglo-Saxon countries.17 It is, for example, possible that the cointegra-
tion rank diﬀers among the Anglo-Saxon countries in estimations including
the GDP per capita. In this case, the asymptotic properties of the panel VAR
estimator derived under the assumption of homogenuous cointegration rank
are no longer valid. Unfortunately, the time series dimension of individual
countries is too small for meaningful country-speciﬁc testing of the cointe-
gration rank. Thus, the ambiguity concerning the estimation results of the
Anglo-Saxon countries has to be left to be addressed in future studies.
4.6 Conclusions
In this study we assessed the relationship between income inequality and
savings using a panel of developed economies. We also tested the assumption
presented in early theoretical literature on income variation that the size dis-
tribution of income could follow a random walk. According to the results,
income inequality, measured with the logarithmic top 1% income share, log-
arithmic aggregate savings and logarithmic private consumption are driven
by stochastic trends. The non-stationarity of the logarithmic top 1% income
share implies that the current macroeconomic literature may have taken an
erroneous stand by assuming a stationary process of income variation.
The results concerning cointegration between the top 1% income share
and gross savings were contradictory as the series were found to be coin-
tegrated by both of the used tests only in the Nordic countries. All tests
found the top 1% income share and private consumption to be cointegrated,
which indicates that there is a long-run steady-state relation between them.
The long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to inequality
was found to be negative in the Central-European and Nordic countries,
but positive in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This result implies that, in the
17To check that this result does not relate to the expansion of credit in the wake of
growing inequality, we added the domestic credit claims on the private sector as an ex-
planatory variable for Anglo-Saxon countries. The variable was found to be I(1) according
to all panel unit root tests mentioned in section three. The variable was obtained from
IMF database. Adding a measure of credit did not change the main results for Anglo-
Saxon countries and it has the expected statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on private
consumption.
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Anglo-Saxon countries, the marginal propensity to save would decrease with
income, while in the rest of the countries it would increase. However, estima-
tion results for the Anglo-Saxon countries crucially depend on the inclusion
of the GDP per capita series. When the GDP per capita was not included
in the estimation, the parameter estimate of the top 1% income share was
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, it is possible that the inclusion
of the GDP per capita series may introduce some form of bias in the estima-
tion of Anglo-Saxon countries which cannot be controlled with current panel
estimation methods.
One assumption that needs to be tested in the future is the assumption
of homogenous cointegration rank among the Anglo-Saxon countries. If the
cointegration rank has diﬀered among the Anglo-Saxon countries in estima-
tions including the GDP per capita, the estimates will have been biased.
In this study, the individual country cointegration relations could not be
tested, because testing would have required considerably more time series
observations than were available in our dataset. For the Nordic and Central-
European countries the observed positive eﬀect of inequality on private sav-
ings seems robust. Estimation results were unchanged when either only the
top 1% income share or the interest rate and the GDP per capita were also
included as explanatory variables. This implies that even if the cointegra-
tion rank has diﬀered within the groups of Nordic and Central-European
countries in estimations with additional explanatory variables, this has not
changed the basic results.
So, although the results for the Anglo-Saxon countries are somewhat in-
conclusive, the results for the Nordic and Central-European countries clearly
indicate that income inequality leads to higher level of private savings. This
result is well in-line with the theoretical and micro-econometric evidence. It
also implies that the controversy surrounding the results of the previous em-
pirical macroeconomic studies has been likely to result from miss-speciﬁcation
of the estimated models by assuming stationary income inequality.
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Appendix G
Panel cointegration test by
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre
(2006)
Panel cointegration test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006)
is based on the normalized bias and the pseudo t-ratio test statistics by
Pedroni (2004). The data generating process behind Pedroni’s test statistics
is given by:
yit = fi(t) + x′it + eit;△xit = vit;
eit = iei;t−1 + itit = (it; vit)′; (G.1)
where fi(t) includes member speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and deterministic trends.
The data generating process is described as a partitioned vector z′it ≡(yit; xit) where the true process is generated as zit = zi;t−1 + it,  ′it = (yitXit )
(Pedroni 2004). 1√
T
∑[Tr]t=1 it is assumed to converge to a vector Brownian
motion with asymptotic covariance of 
i as T Ð→∞. The individual process
is assumed to be i:i:d: so that E[it ′js] = 0 ∀s; t; i ≠ j.
Let e^it denote the estimated residuals of obtained from (G.1) and 
^i the
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consistent estimator of 
i. The two test statistics can now be deﬁned as :
~Z^NT−1 ≡ N∑
i=1 ( T∑t=1 e^2i;t−1)
−1 T∑
t=1(e^i;t−1e^it − ^i);
~Z ∗^
tNT
≡ N∑
i=1 ( T∑t=1 s^∗2i e^∗2i;t−1)
−1/2 T∑
t=1(e^∗i;t−1e^∗it);
where ^i = 1/T ∑kis=1 (1 − s/(ki + 1))∑Tt=s+1 ^it^i;t−s, ~2NT ≡ 1/N ∑Ni=1 L^−211i^2i ,
s^∗2i ≡ 1/t∑Tt=1 ^∗2it , ~s∗2NT ≡ 1/N ∑Ni=1 s^∗2i , L^211i = 1/T ∑Tt=1 #^2it+ 2/T ∑kis=1 (1 − s/(k − i + 1))∑Tt=s+1 #^i; #^i;t−s. The residuals ^it; ^∗it and #^it are
attained from regressions: e^it = ^e^i;t−1 + ^it, e^it = ^ie^i;t−1 +∑K−ik=1 ^ike^i;t−k + ^∗it,
yit = ∑Mm=1 b^mixmi;t = #^it. (Pedroni 1999, 2004)
The statistics pool the between dimension of the panel and they are con-
structed by computing the ratio of the corresponding conventional time series
statistics and then by computing the standardized sum of the N time series
of the panel. Pedroni (1999, 2004) shows that under the null of no cointe-
gration the asymptotic distributions of the two statistics presented above
converge to normal distributions with zero mean and variance of one as N
and T sequentially converge to inﬁnity.
Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2006) extend the model by Pedroni
(2004) to include common factors:
yi;t = fi(t) + x′i;t + ui;t;△xi;t = vi;t;
fi(t) = i + it
uit = F ′ti + eit
(G.2)
where ei;t = iei;t + i;t and F ′t :s are the common factors which are used to
account for the possible cross-sectional dependence.
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Appendix H
Panel trace cointegration test
statistic by Larsson and Lyhagen
(2007)
The trace cointegration test by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) is based on the
following model:
△Yt =  +Yt−1 +m−1k=1  kYt−k + t; (H.1)
where  = (′1; ′2; :::; ′N)′, t = (′1t; ′2t; :::; ′nt), Yt−1 and Yt−k are of order
Np×1,  and  k are Np×Np, and t is assumed to be multivariate normally
distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix 
ij.
It is assumed that matrix  has a reduced rank of Nr, 0 ≤ r ≤ p, which
is speciﬁed as  = ik′kj (Larsson and Lyhagen 2007). Matrices  and  are
both order of Np×Nr and the former contains the short-run coeﬃcient and
the latter the long-run coeﬃcient. In , ii ≡ i for each rank of r. Because
of the restriction, kj = 0 ∀i ≠ j, the block matrix elements of  are given by
Nk=1ik′kj = ij′j.
The cointegration rank is estimated by sequentially testing
H(r) ∶ rank() ≤ Nr (H.2)
against the alternative
H(p) ∶ rank() ≤ Np; (H.3)
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which is the same method as in Johansen (1995).
Deﬁne QT as the maximum likelihood ratio test statistic for the test of
H(r) against H(p), and assume that the matrix ′ ⊥   ⊥ has a full rank
and that the roots of the characteristic polynomial
A(z) = (1 − z)INp − ′z −m−1i=1  k(1 − z)zi (H.4)
lie outside the complex unit circle. Now, if r > 0,
-2 log Qt
wÐ→ U + V; (H.5)
as T Ð→ ∞, where V is 2 with N(N − 1)r(p − r) degrees of freedom inde-
pendent of U , and
U = tr {∫ dBF ′ (∫ FF ′)−1∫ FdB′} : (H.6)
Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) show that the limit distribution of the test
statistic (H.5) equals the convolution of Dickey-Fuller distribution (B) and
an independent 2 variate (F ). The distribution can be simulated by approx-
imating the Wiener process of B by a random walk.
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Appendix I
Panel DSUR and Panel VAR
estimators
I.1 Panel DSUR estimator by Mark et al. (2005)
The data generation process in Mark et al. (2005) DSUR estimator is of the
form
yit = i + it + t + ′xit + uit; (I.1)△xit = eit (I.2)
where there are n cointegrating regression each with T observations, (1−′)
is the cointegration vector between yit and xit, and xit and eit are k × 1 di-
mensional vectors. Panel DSUR eliminates the possible endogeneity between
explanatory variables and the dependent variable by assuming that uit is
correlated at most with pi leads and lags of △xit (Mark et al. 2005). The
possible endogeneity can be controlled by projecting uit onto these pi leads
and lags:
uit = pi∑
s=−pi 
′
i;s△ xi;t−s + uit∗ = ′izit + u∗it: (I.3)
The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all leads and lags of △xit and the
estimated equation becomes:
yit = i + it + t + ′xit + izit + u∗it; (I.4)
where ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. Panel DSUR estimates a long-
run covariance matrix that is used in estimation of equation (I.1). This makes
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panel DSUR more eﬃcient when cross-sections are dependent. The eﬃciency
of panel DSUR actually improves as the correlation between cross-sections
increases. Asymptotics properties of the estimator are based on T Ð→ ∞
with N ﬁxed.
I.2 Panel VAR estimator by Breitung (2005)
Breitung (2005) proposes a panel VAR(p) model which can be presented as
a panel vector error-correction model (VECM) as
△yit =  idt + i′y;t−1 +p−1j=1 ij △ yi;t−j + it; (I.5)
where dt is a vector of deterministic variables and  i a k × k matrix of un-
known coeﬃcients,  ij is unrestricted matrix, and it is a white noise error
vector with E(it) = 0 and positive deﬁnite covariance matrix i = E(it′it).
The model is estimated in two stages. First, the models are estimated sepa-
rately acrossN cross-section units. Then cointegration vectors are normalized
so that they do not depend on individual speciﬁc parameters. Second, the
system is transformed to a pooled regression of the form:
z^it = ′yi;t−1 + v^it; (I.6)
where z^it = (^′i^−1i ^i)−1^′i^−1i △ yit and v^it is deﬁned in similar fashion. The
cointegration matrix, , can now be estimated from (I.6) using the OLS esti-
mator. It is assumed that the statistical units included in the panel have the
same cointegration rank. Consistent estimation is based on sequential limits.
Cross-sectional correlation is accounted by using an estimated asymptotic
covariance matrix.
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